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1 Mutual consent in network formation
During the past two decades there has emerged an extensive literature on game theoretic models of
network formation. Seminally, the fundamentals of such a game theoretic perspective were set out
by Aumann and Myerson (1988) inwhich players are guided by theMyerson value of corresponding
communication situations. is contribution explored network formation under mutual consent
through a non-cooperative signalling game: A link between two players is formed if and only if
both players signal to each other their willingness to form this relationship. e main problem of
this “Myerson model” (Myerson, 1991) is that the network without any links is always supported
through a Nash equilibrium of this signalling game. is would lead to a paradox that network
formation under mutual consent always fails, while human nature as a social networker is well
established (Seabright, 2010; Harari, 2014).1 Nevertheless the Myerson model is and remains the
most natural and convincing non-cooperative model of network formation under mutual consent.
e relative failure of the non-cooperative approach induced Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to in-
troduce an alternative game theoretic formulation, which is founded on a cooperative framework.
In their approach, Jackson and Wolinsky let pairs of players to cooperatively deviate from an exist-
ing network to modify it. e equilibrium networks under such pairwise modification are denoted
as pairwise stable networks. Pairwise stability provided a fertile foundation for further exploration
of exploration of network formation under collective consent. is resulted in variants of pairwise
stability.
∗I thank my co-authors Sudipta Sarangi, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Owen Sims for their contributions and support to
explore the paradoxes of social network formation under the hypothesis of mutual consent. e work summarised here
could not have been developed without their insights and help.
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1e relative failure of Myerson’s model to explain non-trivial network formation resulted in the abandonment of
the project to explain non-trivial network formation under mutual consent. An alternative mathematical model was
introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000) that is based on one-sided link formation: ere is consent assumed to be necessary
to form relationships. e resulting equilibrium networks are denoted as Nash networks in the subsequently developed
literature. is approach is unsatisfactory due to its unnatural social foundations with rather limited applicability to
explain social and economic phenomena.
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Although the cooperative approach founded on pairwise stability has been very successful in
explaining the emergence of non-trivial networks, there remained a gap in our understanding con-
cerning a purely non-cooperative approach to the modelling of mutual consent in network forma-
tion. is has been more recently explored through the design of bespoke equilibrium concept
applied in the Myerson model. In particular, Gilles and Sarangi (2010) introduced a model of trust-
ing behaviour in network formation through trust-based belief systems. e equilibrium concept
that is used in these models is based on Fudenberg and Levine (1993)’s notion of self-confirming
equilibrium in which all players’ beliefs are confirmed in the actual equilibrium strategies. e
resulting equilibrium networks—denoted as monadically stable networks—have very strong prop-
erties, corresponding to a specific subclass of pairwise stable networks.
is survey explores the various methodologies to properly model mutual consent in network
formation. I compare the different classes of equilibrium networks that emerge from these different
methodologies. Aer discussing the principles of link formation under mutual consent, I turn to
the exploration of Jackson-Wolinsky type stability concepts based on cooperative behaviour. I dis-
tinguish different subclasses of stable network based on hypotheses about how coalitions of certain
sizes can modify the current network. is mainly pertains to single individual players and pairs
of player, but it also extends to coalitions of players of arbitrary size—resulting in the notion of a
strongly stable network (Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005).
Subsequently, I turn to main non-cooperative theory of network formation under mutual con-
sent, namely the Myerson model (Myerson, 1991). e main insight in that model is that the empty
network is always an equilibrium network, irrespective of the hypotheses on the linking cost struc-
ture. I survey the results from the literature that categorise the various classes of equilibrium net-
works in the Myerson model with two- as well as one-sided link formation costs. ere emerges a
close link to certain classes of stable networks in the sense of the Jackson-Wolinsky framework.
Next, I discuss the idea of equilibrium refinement in theMyersonmodel to reflect considerations
of mutual trust in link formation. Indeed, links are representations of socio-economic relationships
that are founded on deep mutual trust between the interacting parties. is results in the monadic
stability concept in the Myerson model, in which mutual trust is modelled through a belief system
that is required to be confirmed through the equilibrium strategies of the various players. I explore
the properties of these networks as well as their existence using Monderer and Shapley (1996)’s
theory of game-theoretic potentials.
I conclude this survey by looking at an alternative method to modelling mutual consent in link-
and network formation. is refers to the introduction of correlated strategies in the Myerson
model as a tool to represent coordinated interaction. e resulting class of “correlated equilibrium
networks” still needs to be explored in future research.
2 Introducing mutual consent: Modelling principles
roughout this survey, I use game theoretic techniques to model of how relationships or “links”
between pairs of socio-economic agents come about. ese socio-economic agents are denoted as
players in the context of these models. Each player is assumed to be a fully rational individual deci-
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sion maker that acts according to a set of behavioural rules described in the developed equilibrium
concept.
Besides the specific behavioural hypotheses on which these equilibrium concepts are based, it
is important to realise that there are some fundamental broad axioms made. ese fundamental
axioms introduce a few fundamental limitations of the approach that is surveyed here:
(i) is game-theoretic approach is purely static in nature. is implies that we start from a
zero state in which no links exist and in which these socio-economic agents decidewhether
and which links to build. e end result is a fully formed network in which certain value-
generating activities are achieved. It would be more realistic to model the formation of
a network as a dynamic building process. However, in the static conception followed
throughout this survey, one network does not evolve into another.
is has major consequences for how we view network formation and which networks
actually are identified in these constructions. Indeed, the identified equilibrium networks
do not exhibit the features of large social networks identified in the literature quoted on so-
cial networks (Newman, 2010; Baraba´si, 2016). So, these equilibrium networks are usually
neither scale-free nor small world networks nor satisfying the basic property of assortative
mixing. is is a severe limitation of such a static approach.2
On the other hand, the static approach highlights certain properties of rational decision
making in the context of pairwise cooperation, required for building value-generating
relationships under mutual consent. Rather contradictorily, the main theorem in Myer-
son’s non-cooperative model shows that the static approach actually shows that rational
decision-making does actually not result into any sensible network formation—the empty
network is always supported through a Nash equilibrium in the Myerson model. Only if
we impose that the decision makers are boundedly rational—and, thus, use animal spirits
rather than optimisation in decision making—we arrive at the conclusion that non-trivial
and sensible networks emerge under mutual consent.3 is important insight is the main
conclusion presented in this survey.
(ii) e game-theoretic approach explored in this survey is founded on a negative stability
methodology. Hence, a network is called “stable” if there are no incentives to change the
network. is is the standard methodology in game theory and neo-Walrasian economics.
Rather than constructing an actual building process, this methodology only looks at which
networks cannot emerge due to the existing incentives to change the network that the
players are endowed with. We thus arrive at a class of equilibrium networks that describe
configurations in which such incentives for deviation are absent.
e consequence of the application of this standard game-theoretic methodology is that
2In my discussion in this survey I omit the recent development of incentive-based stochastic models of network
formation. is approach focuses not only on game theoretic incentives in network formation—as the subject maer
of this survey—but combines this concept with stochastic processes that describe random meetings. is approach was
seminally developed in Jackson and Rogers (2005, 2007) and further addressed in, e.g., Golub and Livne (2010).
3is is captured in the notion of a monadically stable network that is founded on trusting behaviour by the play-
ers. Such trusting behaviour is fundamentally boundedly rational. Indeed, to trust another player is not founded on
calculation, but on a leap of faith.
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reality is only approximated. is approach, for example, does not allow the mixing of
modes of incentives, which is common in real-life interaction. is, therefore, is another
reason why the theoretically derived networks do not have the desired features discussed
in the literature on large social networks as surveyed by Baraba´si (2016).
As stated, in this survey I limit myself on a model of consent in network formation. e next section
sets out the basic framework ofmodellingmutual consent in the formation of a relationship between
two players.
Players, links and networks. We work with the basic concepts from the theory of social net-
works set out in the literature. Following the accepted symbolism, the setN = {1, . . . ,n} represents
a set of players, each of which represent an intelligent decision maker. e fundamental issue ad-
dressed here is how these players will build pairwise or binary relationships with other players and
ultimately construct a socio-economic network consisting of such binary relationships.
Each player i ∈ N is explicitly endowed with the social ability to build such pairwise relation-
ships or links with other players, provided that consent is given by the other party. Again following
the accepted terminology in the literature (Jackson, 2008), the pairwise subset {i, j} ⊂ N with i , j
denotes a pairwise relationship between players i ∈ N and j ∈ N . We follow convention and use
the shorthand notation for such a relationship: ij = {i, j} ∈ дN is a link between players i ∈ N and
j ∈ N , where
дN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N and i , j} = {ij | i, j ∈ N } (1)
denotes the set of all potential links on the player set N . As such the set дN acts as the universe of
all potential links on player set N .
A network on N is now an arbitrary subset of links, i.e., any subset д ⊂ дN is a network on N .
In particular, д = д0 =  is the empty network on N which describes a situation where no links are
formed. Furthermore, д = дN is the complete network on N , which is the largest network consisting
of all potential links among players in N . We introduce GN = {д | д ⊂ дN } as the collection of all
networks on N .
e neighbourhood of player i ∈ N in network д ∈ GN is given by
Ni (д) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ д}. (2)
e collection of corresponding neighbouring relationships or links is denoted by Li (д) = {ij ∈ д |
j ∈ Ni (д)}. e complete collection of all potential links that involve player i ∈ N—or that can be
formed by player i—is denoted by Li = Li (дN ) = {ij | j , i}.
Adding and deleting links to a network. In models of network formation we consider the
deletion and addition of links to given networks. For this I introduce some well-accepted notation
(Jackson, 2008). Consider a network д ∈ GN . For every pair of players i, j ∈ N with ij < д we now
denote by д+ ij the network that results from д by adding the link ij < д, i.e., д+ ij = д∪ {ij} ∈ GN .
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Similarly, for some collection of links h ⊂ дN with д ∩ h = , we denote д + h = д ∪ h the network
that results from adding link collection h to the network д.
Next, consider two players i, j ∈ N with ij ∈ д. We denote by д− ij = д \ {ij} ∈ GN the network
that results from removing the link ij from the network д. Again, for any collection of links h ⊂ д
we denote д − h = д \ h the network that results from removing the links in h from the network д.
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 1: Illustration for link addition and deletion.
Example 2.1 With these notational conventions we are now equipped to address link formation
processes. To illustrate this notation, consider the networkд = {12, 13, 24, 34, 35} onN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
as depicted in Figure 1 above consisting of the red and black links. Considering the green link
45 < д, then д′ = д + 45 = {12, 13, 24, 34, 35, 45} is depicted in Figure 1 as the network consist-
ing of all coloured links. Finally, removing the red link set h = {13, 35} ⊂ д from д results into
д′′ = {12, 24, 34}, depicted by collection of the black links only in Figure 1. 
Payoffs. roughout the literature on game theoretic approaches to network formation, players
are assumed to be fully incentivised in their drive to build and maintain links as well as delete links
in existing networks. ese incentives are introduced as a individualised payoff function. Indeed,
for every player i ∈ N we introduce a network payoff function as φi : GN → R, which assigns to
every network д ∈ GN a value φi (д) that evaluates i’s situation as a member of the networked
community described by д.
A network payoff for a player captures all values emanating in the structured community that is
perceived or received by that player. is includes all perceived externalities of third parties. In this
regard, the network payoff function can capture widespread externalities from relationship and net-
work formation in that community. e addition of network externalities in the payoff structure of
the game differentiates this inclusive network payoff approach from the more classical cooperative
game theoretic payoff structure employed by Myerson (1977, 1980), Dua and Mutuswami (1997)
and van den Nouweland (1993, 2004). e payoff function including widespread externalities has
been seminally introduced in network theory by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Example 2.2 I illustrate this concept by revisiting the networks depicted in Figure 1. For example,
player 1 can be assigned φ1(д) = 1 as well as φ1(д′) = 5 even though her neighbours in both
networks are exactly the same, i.e., N1(д) = N1(д′) = {2, 3}. is, therefore, captures widespread
externalities from the creation of the link 45 in the network д from the perspective of player 1. 
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We can now capture all payoff information on the population N of players in the vector payoff
function given by φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn) : GN → RN . In particular, I emphasise that the function φ
indeed captures all incentives for the decision makers in N in the network formation processes to
be considered next.
I divide these network formation processes in two groups: First, I consider network formation
stability concepts that directly address the network payoffs represented by φ. Second, I then look at
network formation games that are founded on game theoretic payoff functions—denoted by π—that
are derived from φ within a specific game theoretic environment. ese different approaches are
discussed at length in the subsequent sections of this survey.
3 Jackson-Wolinsky stability concepts
In this section I discuss different concepts of network stability from a link-based perspective as semi-
nally developed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and further explored inGilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi
(2006, 2012). is concerns four fundamental principles, each founding a particular stability con-
cept, and three further derived stability notions. Central to this approach is that while mutual
consent is required for establishing a link, a player is able to delete her links unilaterally. Here, we
focus on link-centred considerations. Hence, how would the deletion of one or more links affects
the players’ payoffs? Similarly, how would the addition of one or more links affect payoffs? ese
mutual considerations are brought together into a link- or network-based notion of stability.
I begin by defining stability where individual players in N make decisions about their bilateral
links and then extend it to multi-player coalitions making decisions about such links. We assume
throughout that there is a given network payoff function φ that describes the incentives of the
player decision makers in this situation.
Deleting links from networks. roughout it is assumed that players have full autonomy or
sovereignty over the decision to delete one or more of her links. Indeed, the principle of mutual
consent requires that players control which links they participate in. is implies that every player
can veto her participation in any link or relationship. Based on this consideration, I introduce two
fundamental stability concepts concerning the deletion of links:
(i) A network д ∈ GN is link deletion proof (LDP) if for every player i ∈ N and every
neighbour j ∈ Ni (д), it holds that φi (д − ij) 6 φi (д).
Link deletion proofness requires that no player has an incentive to sever an existing link
with one of her neighbours.
We denote byD(φ) ⊂ GN the class of all link deletion proof networks for the given payoff
function φ (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
(ii) A network д ∈ GN is strong link deletion proof (SLDP) if for every player i ∈ N and
every set of her direct links h ⊂ Li (д), it holds that φi (д − h) 6 φi (д).
Strong link deletion proofness requires that no player has incentives to sever links with
one or more of her neighbours simultaneously. Obviously, SLDP implies LDP.
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We denote byDs (φ) ⊂ GN the class of all strong link deletion proof networks for the given
payoff function φ (Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi, 2006).
From the definition it is clear that any SLDP network is always LDP and, therefore, strong link
deletion proofness is indeed a stronger notion than (regular) link deletion proofness. As indicated,
LDP was seminally introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), while SLDP was only introduced
as a stand-alone concept in the work on consent in early dras of the seminal (unpublished) paper
on consent in link formation by Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2006).
Second, the empty networkд0 =  on any set of playersN is trivially strong link addition proof.
Indeed, this network does not contain any links and, therefore, the deletion of links is vacuously
satisfied. We can therefore summarise that
Proposition 3.1 For any network payoff function φ : GN → RN it holds that
д0 ∈ Ds (φ) ⊂ D(φ) ⊂ GN . (3)
e first question that I consider is under which conditions link deletion proofness is exactly the
same as strong link deletion proofness. is seems a rather innocuous question, since SLDP is so
much stronger a concept than LDP. Nevertheless, it is enlightening to identify the exact property
on the network payoff structure φ that allows this equivalence.
eorem 3.2 Strong link deletion proofness and link deletion proofness are equivalent for network
payoff structure φ in the sense that D(φ) = Ds (φ) if and only if the network payoff structure φ is
convex on the class of link deletion proof networksD(φ) ⊂ GN in the sense that for every LDP network
д ∈ D(φ), every player i ∈ N and every link set h ⊂ Li with h ∩ Li (д) =  it holds that∑
i j ∈h
[φi (д + ij) − φi (д) ] > 0 implies that φi (д + h) > φi (д). (4)
For a proof of eorem 3.2 I refer to Appendix A.1 of this survey.4
e convexity property on the payoff structure φ requires that if the sign of the sum of values
from adding one link to a network from a set of links fully determines whether adding all links is
beneficial or not. Hence, looking at links one-by-one gives complete information about whether it
is beneficial to add all links to the network or not.
Adding links to networks. Next I consider how players assess the addition of a link to an ex-
isting network. Again we take the idea of consent in link formation as central into our reasoning
here. Here, this implies that both parties in the formation of a new link have to agree that adding
this link is beneficial. Hence, the addition of a link is
(iii) A network д ∈ GN is link addition proof (LAP) if for all i, j ∈ N with ij < д, it holds that
φi (д + ij) > φi (д) implies φ j (д + ij) < φ j (д).
Link addition proofness states that there are no incentives for any pair of players to form
4roughout, all proofs of the theorems stated in this survey are collected in the appendix to this survey.
7
an additional link. is is based on the requirement of mutual consent in link formation.
Indeed, if one player would like to add a link, the other playerwould have strong objections.
In this case this is formulated as that, if one player has benefits from forming the link, the
other (consenting) party has losses and, thus, would withhold her consent.
We denote byA(φ) ⊂ GN the class of all link addition proof networks for the given payoff
function φ (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
(iv) A network д ∈ GN is strict link addition proof (SLAP) if for all i, j ∈ N , it holds that
ij < д if and only if φi (д + ij) < φi (д) as well as φ j (д + ij) < φ j (д).
Strict link addition proofness is a far stronger notion that LAP. Indeed, it requires that both
players agree that forming an additional link between them is not beneficial for either of
them. is agreement is imposed and only a certain very specific type of network payoff
structures would support such networks to exist. Consequently, it has to be expected that,
for an arbitrary regular network payoff function, only a rather small class of networks
actually satisfies this property.
We denote byAs (φ) ⊂ GN the class of all strict link addition proof networks for the given
payoff structure φ (Gilles and Sarangi, 2010).
To understand link addition proofness in more detail, we can reformulate it. Indeed, a network д is
link addition proof if and only if for all players i, j ∈ N with ij < д :
φi (д + ij) > φi (д) implies φ j (д + ij) 6 φ j (д). (5)
is has some interesting consequences regarding the interpretation of the LAP property. First, a
link ij < д for some i, j ∈ N is non-discerning if it holds that
φi (д + ij) = φi (д) as well as φ j (д + ij) = φ j (д). (6)
From the derivation above, the definition of link addition proofness is indeed ambiguous whether
any non-discerning link ij should be in the network for it to be LAP or not. Hence, such non-
discerning links can be added to or deleted arbitrarily from networks without the LAP property
being affected. us, the class of non-discerning links makes the determination of LAP networks
“fuzzy”.
To address this issue of the addition or deletion of non-discerning links, I introduce a third type
of link addition proofness:
(v) A network д ∈ GN is ⋆-link addition proof (⋆-LAP) if for all players i, j ∈ N , it holds
that if ij < д, then φi (д + ij) > φi (д) implies φ j (д + ij) < φ j (д).
We denote by A⋆(φ) ⊂ GN the class of all ⋆-link addition proof networks for the given
payoff structure φ.
is minor modification of the definition of link addition proofness simply requires that all non-
discerning links should be part of a⋆-link addition proof network. is makes the definition unam-
biguous.
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Example 3.3 To delineate the three link addition proofness concepts introduced here, we can ex-
plore an example of a network payoff function in which these concepts result in different classes
of networks. We consider three players and all possible networks, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3} and GN = {д |
д ⊂ дN } where дN = {12, 23, 13}. Note that there are exactly eight possible networks on N , i.e.,
#GN = 8.
We now consider a particular network payoff function φ on the generated class of networks GN
on N . All potential network payoffs represented by φ can be represented in an appropriately con-
structed table:
Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0 LAP
д1 = {12} 0 0 1 ⋆-LAP
д2 = {13} 0 0 0
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} 2 1 0
д5 = {12, 23} 1 2 0
д6 = {13, 23} 0 1 0
д7 = дN 3 3 3 SLAP
First, note that д0 is link addition proof, but not ⋆-link addition proof. Indeed, if any link is added
to the empty network, no payoffs are changed for any of the players involved. On the other hand,
there are no losses, thus precluding that д0 is ⋆-link addition proof.
Next, д1 is ⋆-link addition proof, but not strong link addition proof. Indeed, any addition of a link
to д1 results into a loss for player 3. However, adding link 13 results into a strict gain for player 1,
implying that д1 is not strong link addition proof.
ird, the complete networkдN is strong link addition proof by tautology. Indeed, there are no links
to be added to this network, and therefore vacuously the property of strong link addition proofness
is satisfied.
Finally, I remark that none of the other networks have any link addition proofness properties. I
leave it to the reader to check this claim. 
Next I explore the equivalence of these link addition proofness concepts. In order to explore these
equivalences effectively, I introduce two auxiliary properties of the network payoff structure.
Definition 3.4 Consider a network payoff structure φ on GN . en:
• e structure φ is said to be discerning on the class of networks G ⊂ GN if for every network
д ∈ G it holds that for any pair i, j ∈ N with ij < д either φi (д + ij) , φi (д) or φ j (д + ij) , φ j (д)
or both.
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• e structure φ is said to be uniform on the class of networks G ⊂ GN if for every network
д ∈ G and for any pair i, j ∈ N with ij < д it holds that
φi (д + ij) > φi (д) implies φ j (д + ij) > φ j (д). (7)
Using these auxiliary concepts we can now show the following equivalences:
eorem 3.5 Let φ be some network payoff structure on the class of all networks GN on the set of
players N . en the following properties hold:
(a) дN ∈ As (φ) ⊂ A⋆(φ) ⊂ A(φ);
(b) It holds that A⋆(φ) = A(φ) if and only if φ is discerning onA(φ), and;
(c) It holds that As (φ) = A⋆(φ) if and only if φ is uniform onA⋆(φ).
For a proof of eorem 3.5 I refer to Appendix A.2 in this survey. Furthermore, from eorem 3.5
it is easily concluded that the following equivalence also holds:
Corollary 3.6 SLAP and LAP are equivalent concepts for payoff structure φ in the sense thatAs (φ) =
A(φ) if and only if the payoff structure φ is discerning and uniform onA(φ).
Pairwise stability. ese four fundamental stability concepts on adding links to and deleting
links from a network are used to define additional, derived stability concepts. e first concept—
known as pairwise stability—combines the weakest link stability notions and has been the subject
of extensive discussion in the literature. It is implicitly assumed in pairwise stability that players
only consider the deletion and addition of one specific link at a time.
(vi) (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) Network д is pairwise stable (PS) if д is link deletion proof
as well as link addition proof. We denote by P(φ) = D(φ) ∩ A(φ) the family of pairwise
stable networks for the payoff function φ.
e original pairwise stability concept as introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) only concerns
itself with the contemplation of adding a single link to or deleting a single link from a given network.
If there are no incentives for players to either add a link to the existing network or delete a link
from the network, then the network is “pairwise stable”; there are no incentives present under the
hypothesis of mutual consent in link formation that anybody wants to change a single link in this
network. In this regard pairwise stability is the seminal network stability concept in this branch of
the literature on network formation.
However, two further combined concepts, which strengthen the notion of pairwise stability,
have particular relevance in the theory of consent in link formation. Strong pairwise stability as-
sumes that players can delete an arbitrary collection of links under their control. Hence, they can
veto any link in which they participate. On the other hand, the contemplation of adding links
remains confined to adding a single link.
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Strict pairwise stability is the strongest notion in this framework. It not only considers that
players can delete any number of their existing links, but also that they are assumed to be in agree-
ment regarding the addition of a link to an existing network. It is clear that for an arbitrary network
payoff structure, the collection of such strictly pairwise stable networks might well be empty. Only
for certain network payoff structures such networks might emerge.5
(vii) (Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi, 2006, 2012) Networkд is strongly pairwise stable (SPS)
if it is strong link deletion proof as well as link addition proof.
We denote by P⋆(φ) = Ds (φ) ∩ A(φ) the family of strongly pairwise stable networks for
the payoff function φ.
(viii) (Gilles and Sarangi, 2010) Network д is strictly pairwise stable (SPS*) if it is strong link
deletion proof as well as strict link addition proof.
We denote by Ps (φ) = Ds (φ) ∩ As (φ) the family of strictly pairwise stable networks for
the payoff function φ.
ese three pairwise stability concepts generate different classes of networks in moist cases. Again
I consider an example to illustrate this.
Example 3.7 Again consider three players and all potentially generatednetworks, i.e.,N = {1, 2, 3}
with дN = {12, 23, 13}. Now, consider a network payoff function φ on the generated class of net-
works GN on N represented in the following table:
Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0 Strongly PS
д1 = {12} 0 0 5 Strictly PS
д2 = {13} 0 0 0
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} -1 0 0
д5 = {12, 23} 0 -1 0
д6 = {13, 23} 0 1 1
д7 = дN 3 3 3 PS
Again we discuss the properties of these networks.
First, note that the empty network д0 is trivially SLDP and in this case as well LAP. erefore, it is
indeed strongly pairwise stable.6
Second, д1 is LDP and, therefore, SLDP. Moreover, д1 is SLAP. Indeed, adding link 13 to д1 results
5I also refer to Gilles and Sarangi (2010) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
6It should be remarked that networks with at most one link are SLDP if they are LDP. erefore, they are strongly
pairwise stable if they are link addition proof and link deletion proof.
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into strict losses for both players 1 and 3. Similarly, for link 23. us, we conclude that д1 is strictly
pairwise stable.
Finally, the complete network дN is SLAP due to being the maximal network. Furthermore, дN is
LDP. However, дN is not SLDP. player 3 has the strict incentive to delete both her links and revert
to network д1.
We conclude from this discussion that this simple network payoff example induces three distinct
classes of pairwise stable networks. 
Using the equivalence results stated in eorems 3.2 and 3.5, we can now conclude the following
equivalences between the formulated pairwise stability concepts. e proofs are rather transparent
and therefore omied.7
Corollary 3.8 Consider a network payoff structure φ on the class of all networks GN on set of players
N . en the following relationships hold:
(a) Ps (φ) ⊂ P⋆(φ) ⊂ P(φ);
(b) Pairwise stability and strong pairwise stability are equivalent concepts for φ in the sense that
P(φ) = P⋆(φ) if and only if φ is convex on P(φ);
(c) Strong pairwise stability and strict pairwise stability are equivalent concepts for φ in the sense
that P⋆(φ) = Ps (φ) if and only if φ is discerning and uniform on P⋆(φ), and;
(d) Pairwise stability and strict pairwise stability are equivalent concepts for φ in the sense that
P(φ) = Ps (φ) if and only if φ is convex, discerning as well as uniform on P(φ).
In this section we discussed the stability concept and its variants in the link-based framework of net-
work formation as seminally set out by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It is clear that these concepts
are rather limited in their scope, since they are link-based only. Individual and collective incen-
tives are not truly taken into account. Indeed, considerations are founded on adding and deleting
links; the players’ incentives are assumed to coincide with the (marginal) benefits generated from
these links rather than the individualised payoffs. In the next section, I will consider an alternative
approach that is completely founded on the benefits to players to the formation of links.
4 A purely non-cooperative approach
e next stage in the development of an understanding of how players build networks is based on
the seminal contribution by Myerson (1991, page 448) to the discussion of how networks form. He
pointed out that in a very simple network formation game—known as the Myerson model—, the
resulting networks that are supported by Nash equilibria in this game always include the empty
network д0. Hence, building no links at all is an equilibrium in the incentive structure generated
by player benefits to network formation.
7e proofs of the equivalences reported in this corollary are based on the proofs ofeorems 3.2 and 3.5, rather than
the properties stated in these theorems.
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Myerson presented this as a negative insight, since it indicates that purely noncooperative game
theory cannot provide a fertile basis for a debate of how networks between players emerge. How-
ever, what this really expresses is that networks are not forming if players act purely selfishly. My
contention is throughout that it actually has to be expected that pure selfishness would undermine
cooperative acts such as forming links between pairs of players.
In this section I explore in detail the Myerson model and two variations that impose an explicit
model of cost of link formation. is includes two-sided link formation costs, in which both parties
involved with the formation of the link contribute to the costs of establishing it. is is balanced
by a one-sided link formation cost approach, in which only the initiator bears the formation costs,
while the respondent has no costs from the formation of this link. We explore the equilibria that
result in both extensions of the Myerson model and show a strong relationship with strong link
deletion proofness as formulated in the previous section.
Preliminaries: Some game theory. is section relies heavily on standard noncooperative
game theory. Again we let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of players. A game is a pair (A,π ) with
A = (A1, . . . ,An) an ordered collection of strategy sets such that each player i ∈ N is assigned her
individual strategy set Ai and a game theoretic payoff function π = (π1, . . . ,πn) : A → RN where
A =
∏
i∈N Ai is the set of all strategy tuples.
Hence, in a non-cooperative game, each player i ∈ N is endowed with her individual strategy
setAi and a payoff function πi : A→ R. e fundamental idea is that every player selects a strategy
that optimises her payoffs, provided that other players also select strategies that affect this payoff.
As such, a game is a mathematical representation of a social interaction situation. Game theory is
now a collection of rules and tools that model how players make decisions in the context of such
social interaction situations.
A strategy tuple is a list a = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ A =
∏
i∈N Ai . We use the convention that the
list of strategies of players other than i ∈ N are indicated by a−i = (a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,an) ∈∏
j ∈N : j,i Aj . Hence, a = (ai ,a−i ).
A strategy tuple a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium in the game (A,π ) if for every player i ∈ N and
any strategy b ∈ Ai it holds that πI (a∗) > πi (b,a∗−i ). In a Nash equilibrium, every player optimises
her strategy, given the strategic choices of all other players. is equilibrium concept has been the
most prominent in game theory since its inception by Nash (1950).
A Nash equilibrium can also be expressed in terms of “best responses”. Formally, a strategy
ai ∈ Ai is a best response to strategy tuple b−i ∈
∏
j ∈N : j,i Aj if for every strategy a′i ∈ Ai it holds
that πi (ai ,b−i ) > πi (a′i ,b−i ). Hence, a best response is the strategy for player i that optimises her
payoffs given that all other players select the strategy b ∈ A.
Now A strategy tuple a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i ∈ N it holds
that a∗i is a best response to a
∗
−i . As such a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the best response
correspondence that is generated by the game. Furthermore, it can be shown that in this respect
a Nash equilibrium usually can be interpreted as a saddle point in a well-constructed geometric
representation of the game.
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4.1 e Myerson model
Myerson (1991) introduced his approach to modelling the formation of networks as an illustration
of the underlying processes that determine the Nash equilibria in a non-cooperative strategic form
game. Myerson’s framework is the quintessential model of consent in link formation. e Myer-
son model encompasses a basic signalling game in which players send each other messages about
whether they want to form a link or not. Due to its very fundamental and basic nature, it is a model
that acts as the benchmark in any discussion on consent in link formation.
In Myerson’s basic framework, players costlessly signal to each other whether they want to
form links. If two players signal both that they would like to form a link, the link is established.
Formally, the Myerson model Γmφ on player set N under network payoff function φ : G
N → RN is a
non-cooperative, strategic form game Γmφ = (Am ,πm) given as follows:
• For every player i ∈ N , her strategy set is given by all vectors of signals to other players in
N :
Ami =
{
ℓi = (ℓi1, ℓi2, . . . , ℓin)
 ℓi j ∈ {0, 1} and ℓii = 1} ; (8)
Here, ℓi j is a signal that player i communicates to player j about her intentions to form a link
with j . If ℓi j = 1, player i indicates that she is interested in forming the link with player j ; if
ℓi j = 0, player i signals that she wants to remain unaached to player j .
• A link ij is now formed if both players i and j signal to each other they want to form the link,
i.e., if ℓi j = ℓji = 1. If we denote by ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn) ∈ Am = Am1 × · · · ×Amn a strategy profile,
then the resulting network can be identified as
д(ℓ) = {ij ∈ дN | ℓi j = ℓji = 1}. (9)
We say that д(ℓ) is the network supported by the strategy profile ℓ in the Myerson model.
• e basic Myerson model is completed by the game theoretic payoff function πm : Am → RN
defined by
πmi (ℓ) = φi (д(ℓ)) . (10)
Here, φ : GN → RN denotes the prevailing network payoff function.
Clearly, the payoff function πm reflects the property that signalling is costless and that there
are no costs incurred in the formation of a link between any pair of players.
In the next subsections I investigate refinements of the Myerson model that take into account link
formation costs. In particular, I investigate the networks that are supported through Nash equilibria
in these game theoretic models.
M-networks. e Nash equilibria in the basic Myerson model form a class of signalling profiles
that support networks on N that are stable against unilateral modification. We denote these Nash
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equilibrium networks as “M-networks” to distinguish this class of networks from other classes of
networks.
Definition 4.1 Let φ be a network payoff function on player set N and let Γmφ = (Am ,πm) be the
corresponding basic Myerson model. A network д ∈ GN is an M-network if there exists a Nash
equilibrium strategy tuple ℓд ∈ Am in Γmφ such that д(ℓд) = д.
Clearly, using the Nash equilibrium conditions and the definition of πm , we get the following M-
network requirement: For every player i ∈ N and every signal vector ℓi ∈ Ami it holds that
φi
(
д(ℓд−i , ℓi )
)
6 φi (д).
e concept of M-network is at the core of the assessment of network formation itself, since it
describes the stable outcomes of the basic signalling framework represented in the Myerson model.
Crucially, Myerson (1991) already pointed out that the empty network is always supported as an
M-network. Formally, this can be expressed as follows.
Proposition 4.2 (Myerson’s Lemma) In the Myerson model = (Am ,πm) = (Am ,πm) the “no-link”
signal profile ℓ0 = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Am is a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the empty network д0 = д(ℓ0)
is an M-network.
Proof. Let ℓ0i j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N , making up the strategy profile ℓ0. en, for any player i ∈ N ,
any signal vector ℓi ∈ Ami is a best response to ℓ0−i , since д(ℓ0−i , ℓi ) = д0 irrespective of the selected
signal vector ℓi . erefore, ℓ
0
i itself is a best response to ℓ
0
−i , showing that ℓ
0 is a Nash equilibrium
in = (Am ,πm) = (Am ,πm).
is property points out that non-trivial M-networks are very hard to form; self-interest easily re-
sults in complete failure and no cooperationmight emerge. In this case this cooperation is expressed
through a non-trivial social network formed between rational decision makers. Myerson’s Lemma
indicates that, without some supporting mechanism, there simply are no incentives to justify that
any links are formed at all. So, Myerson’s Lemma points to the very fundamental issue of human
cooperation: Why would rational human beings be cooperative? In this regard, Myerson’s Lemma
is a very succinct expression of this major question in social science and economics.
e “dual” of Myerson’s Lemma can also be stated and also expresses a deficiency in the func-
tionality of the Myerson model. Indeed, if for every player i ∈ N the network payoff function φi is
strictly increasing in the link set, then the class of supported networks is the whole network class
G
N . erefore, the following properties indicate the largeness of the class of M-networks.
Proposition 4.3 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm).
(a) Every M-network is strong link deletion proof.
(b) Every strong deletion proof network is an M-network.
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(c) Suppose that the network payoff structure φ is linkmonotone in the sense that for every player
i ∈ N , every network д ∈ GN and every link ij < Li (д) it holds that φi (д + ij) > φi (д). en
every network д ∈ GN is supported as an M-network.
Proof. First, we show assertion (a). Suppose that there is an M-network д ∈ GN supported by a
Nash equilibrium strategy profile ℓ ∈ Am that is not strong link deletion proof. en there is some
i ∈ N and hi ⊂ Li (д) with φi (д − hi ) > φi (д). But then player i can modify his linking strategy as
ℓ′i j = 0 if ij ∈ hi and ℓ′i j = ℓi j . en д(ℓ−i , ℓ′i ) = д − hi implying that πmi (ℓ−i , ℓ′i ) > πm(ℓ). erefore,
ℓ cannot be a Nash equilibrium in (Am ,πm). is is a contradiction, showing the assertion.
Next, consider assertion (b). Let д ∈ Ds (φ) be a strong link deletion proof network for the network
payoff function φ on N . Suppose that д is not an M-network. en the corresponding signalling
tuple ℓд—where ℓ
д
i j = 1 if ij ∈ д and ℓ
д
i j = 0 otherwise—is not a Nash equilibrium strategy tuple
in the Myerson model Γφ . Hence, there is a player i ∈ N and an alternative strategy ℓi ∈ Ai with
ℓi , ℓ
д
i such that π
m
i (ℓд) < πmi (ℓi , ℓ
д
−i ). If we denote by h + i = {ij | ℓ
д
i j = 1 and ℓi j = 0}, then
it is clear that д(ℓi , ℓд−i ) = д − hi ⊂ Li (д). Using the definition of the Myerson payoff function πm ,
we have established that φi (д) < φi (д − hi ), which contradicts the hypothesis that д is strong link
deletion proof.
To show assertion (c), suppose that φ is link monotone. Take any network д ∈ GN and construct a
strategy profile ℓд ∈ Am by ℓдi j = 1 if and only if ij ∈ д, for all i, j ∈ N . It is easy to see that ℓд is
indeed a Nash equilibrium in (Am ,πm) due to φ being link monotone: For any i ∈ N , any deviation
ℓi from ℓ
д
i induces the link set Li (д(ℓ
д
−i , ℓi )) ⊆ Li (д) for i. is implies by link monotonicity that
πmi (ℓ
д
−i , ℓi ) = φi (д(ℓ
д
−i , ℓi )) 6 φi (д) = πm(ℓд).
In the literature on the Myerson model, the two fundamental insights presented as Myerson’s
Lemma and Proposition 4.3 have motivated economists and social scientists to look into alternative
equilibrium concepts, known as “refinements” of the Nash equilibrium concept. ese refinement
equilibrium concepts have been developed particularly for addressing link formation issues from
the perspective of consent. ese aempts can be divided into two classes.
First, the standard approach in game theoretic models of network formation is to strictly ap-
ply methodological individualistic perspectives. us, all motivations emanate from the player
decision makers and are not considered tot be external to the rational decision making process.
is has resulted into a number of equilibrium concepts that simply assume that decision mak-
ers have a natural ability to cooperate if the incentives are in favour of such cooperation. Below
I present the refinements considered by Bloch and Jackson (2006), van de Rijt and Buskens (2008)
and Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2011).
e second approach is to explicitly assume that decision makers are not fully individualistic,
but adhere to some institutional or trusting norms of behaviour. Gilles and Sarangi (2010) explic-
itly introduce a model of trusting behaviour through the introduction of a individualised belief or
conjecture that other decision makers will form links if they benefit from that. us, the trust in
network formation is internalised into the player decision makers; all such decision makers adhere
to a well-defined norm of decisionmaking that expresses trusting behaviour. is is fully developed
in the next Section.
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Similarly, certain equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative game theory are founded on institu-
tional signalling systems. e main such concept is Aumann’s correlated equilibrium, which can be
used to introduce institutional arrangements in the decision making processes of players (Aumann,
1974). Here these institutions are explicitly modelled as external to these players. ey adhere to
these institutions since they benefit from applying these institutional behavioural rules instead of
acting purely selfish. Unfortunately, the application of correlated equilibrium to network formation
models has not been pursued in the literature.
Unilateral stability. e mathematical sociologists van de Rijt and Buskens (2008) proposed a
refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that considers expanding a player’s ability to affect the
network that is formed in a broader way than allowed through best response rationality underlying
the Nash equilibrium concept. ey recognised that themultitude of Nash equilibria in theMyerson
model is due to a simple (mis-)coordination problem: Players are indifferent between proposing or
not proposing a link if the other player actually does not propose the link herself already. is
resulted in the following refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Definition 4.4 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm). A network д ∈ GN is unilaterally stable if there exists a strategy profile
ℓ ∈ Am in the Myerson model with д(ℓ) = д such that
(i) for all i ∈ N and ℓ′i ∈ Ami : πmi (ℓ) > πmi (ℓ′i , ℓ−i ) (Nash equilibrium condition), and
(ii) for every i ∈ N and every alternative strategy ℓ′i ∈ Ami , it holds that
πmi (ℓ⋆) > πmi (ℓ)
implies that there is some j ∈ N with ℓ′i j = 1 and ℓi j = 0 for whom
πmj (ℓ⋆) < πmj (ℓ),
where ℓ⋆ ∈ Am is given by ℓ⋆i = ℓ′i , ℓ⋆jk = ℓjk for j , i , k and ℓ⋆ji = ℓ′i j for j , i.
A network is unilaterally stable if it is supported through a Nash equilibrium in the Myerson model
under the additional provision that every player can modify her direct neighbourhood provided
that this modification can be constructed with the consent of her chosen neighbours. So, if i’s
proposalwouldmake herself beer off, then all newly selected neighbourswould have no objections
and would not receive lower payoffs as a consequence of this modification of the network. An
alternative definition of unilateral stability only using network concepts and without reference to
the Myerson model is also possible as captured in the box below.
Proposition 4.5 (An alternative definition of unilaterally stable networks)
A network д ∈ GN is unilaterally stability if and only if д is an M-network such that for every player
i ∈ N and all link sets h−i ⊂ Li (д) and h+i ⊂ Li (дn \ д) it holds that either φi (д − h−i + h+i ) 6 φi (д) or
φi (д − h−i + h+i ) > φi (д) implies there is some j ∈ N such that ij ∈ h+i and φ j (д − h−i + h+i ) < φ j (д).
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Unilateral stability is the strongest individualistic or “monadic” network formation concept that
has been proposed in the literature. Indeed, going beyond the unilateral formation of links under
consent as formulated here would actually involve active participation of multiple players. We
discuss these extensions below.
We first turn to discussing some simple properties of unilateral stability.
Proposition 4.6 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm). en the following properties hold:
(a) Every unilaterally stable network is strongly pairwise stable.
(b) ere exist strictly pairwise stable networks that are not unilaterally stable.
(c) If the network payoff structure φ is link monotone, then дN ∈ GN is the unique unilaterally
stable network for φ.
I prove all three assertions in Proposition 4.6 in a relaxed fashion, rather than a strict mathematical
way.
First, from Proposition 4.3 it follows that every M-network д is strong link deletion proof. Fur-
thermore, applying the unilateral stability condition to a single link ij ∈ д reduces to the LAP
property. is immediately shows assertion 4.6(a).
Next, if the network payoff structure is linkmonotone, then there are no objections of any player
to add more links to an existing network. Hence, the complete network дN is the only M-network
that satisfies the unilateral stability condition, implying assertion 4.6(c).
Finally, to show assertion 4.6(b), I device an example for the case of three players. is example
also has an important role to assess the relationship between unilateral stability and other stability
concepts, introduced further down in these lecture notes.
Example 4.7 Here, consider three players N = {1, 2, 3} and a network payoff structure φ given in
the next table.
Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0 Strongly PS
д1 = {12} 0 0 2 Strictly PS
д2 = {13} 0 0 0
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} -1 0 0
д5 = {12, 23} 0 -1 0
д6 = {13, 23} 0 1 1
д7 = дN 3 3 3 U-stable
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Here, д0 is strongly pairwise stable, but is not unilaterally stable. Indeed, player 3 can add both
links 13 and 23 to make д6 without objection of the other players.
Furthermore, д1 is strictly pairwise stable and again not unilaterally stable. As before, player 3 can
add links 13 and 23 to move to дN without any objections of the other two players. is shows
assertion 4.6(b).
Also, it is clear from the table that the complete network дN is unilaterally stable, since it is strong
link deletion proof. Note that in this case дN is strictly pairwise stable as well.
Finally, I refer to Example 5.8 for a detailed discussion of an example in which assertion 4.6(b) is
strengthened, showing that there are cases that the class of strictly pairwise stable networks is
completely disjoint from the class of unilaterally stable networks. 
To assess unilateral stability, it is clear that van de Rijt and Buskens (2008) introduce it as an ex-
pression of firmly methodological individualistic behavioural principles: Players act selfishly only,
but conjecture that other players will consent to the creation of links that directly benefit them.
It builds on the hypothesis that players offer no objections to the formation of links that directly
benefit them.
However, an alternative interpretation can easily be applied here as well. Indeed, the unilateral
stability concept can be interpreted to be an application of a principle of trusting behaviour: players
trust others to consent to forming links if it does not hurt them. is is closely akin to the model of
trusting behaviour that will be introduced and discussed in Section 2.4. ere I will also investigate
the relationship between unilateral stability and so-called monadic stability introduced there.
Bilateral stability and its extensions. e second type of refinements of the M-network con-
cept implements the idea of cooperation between player decision makers to modify the network
through coordinated actions. us, it is assumed that decision makers can cooperate in this fash-
ion and will do so if they have the required incentives. is approach clearly fits in the realm of
applying cooperative equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative decision situations.
For the purpose of network formation this in particular can be applied to bilateral or pairwise
coordinated modification. So, we consider any pair of players i, j ∈ N who consider how to modify
their strategic signals ℓi and ℓj to modify the resulting network in their favour. is bilaterally co-
ordinated action can be modelled in two different fashion. First, within the Myerson model as the
so-called “pairwise” Nash equilibrium and, second, as a network stability notion, denoted as “bilat-
eral” stability.8 e next definition formalises this as proposed by Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi
(2011).
Definition 4.8 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm).
8I remark here that I use a terminology that deviates from the literature. Indeed, a pairwise Nash equilibrium in the
Myerson model was seminally introduced in Goyal and Joshi (2006) and discussed further by Bloch and Jackson (2006).
It refers to M-networks that are additionally link addition proof. As shown in the next section for a more general seing
this is simply equivalent to strong pairwise stability. erefore, I use the notion of pairwise Nash equilibrium in a slightly
different way as introduced in Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2011).
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(i) A signal profile ℓ ∈ Am is a pairwise Nash equilibrium in (Am ,πm) if ℓ is a Nash equilib-
rium in (Am ,πm) and for every pair of players i, j ∈ N it holds that
πmi
(
ℓ′i , ℓ
′
j , ℓ−i, j
)
> πmi (ℓ) implies that πmj
(
ℓ′i , ℓ
′
j , ℓ−i, j
)
< πmj (ℓ) (11)
for all deviations ℓ′i ∈ Ami and ℓ′j ∈ Amj . (Here, ℓ−i, j refers to the restricted signal profile
(ℓh)h,i, j .)
(ii) A network д ∈ GN is bilaterally stable if д is strong deletion proof for φ and for every pair
of players i, j ∈ N and network д′ = д + hˆ − hi − hj with hˆ ∈ { {ij},}, hi ⊂ Li (д) and
hj ⊂ Lj (д) it holds that
φi (д′) > φi (д) implies that φ j (д′) < φ j (д). (12)
It is not hard to see that in the Myerson model there is a complete equivalence between these two
concepts. e pairwise Nash equilibrium is simply a strategic formulation of bilateral stability. I
give the following proposition therefore without proof.
Proposition 4.9 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm). A network д ∈ GN is supported through a pairwise Nash equilibrium ℓ ∈ Am
with д(ℓ) = д if and only if д is bilaterally stable for φ.
Although these concepts are quite natural within the context of network formation, the additional
benefits are rather limited. Coordinated pairwise activity is well captured by the three pairwise
stability concepts that have been introduced in this survey. e notion of unilateral stability also
captures coordinated action in the sense that it is assumed that players respond positively to a
player’s proposal to change the network if that is to their benefit. Bilateral stability does not extend
this to pairs of players, but reverts back to the normal best response rationality principle that others
keep their actions unchanged.
Finally, I remark that Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2011) extend the discussion of bilateral
stability to coordinated actions by any coalition of a specified size r . is is denoted as stability of
order r . e above discussion is restricted to r = 2.
Strong stability. Next I discuss some of the ideas put forward by Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2005). ey investigated networks that emerge if coalitions of arbitrary size can make changes to
the network in a coordinated fashion to the coalition’s overall benefit. is approach is based on the
strong equilibrium concept proposed by Aumann (1959) in non-cooperative game theory. Jackson-
Nouweland’s concept of strong stability is a network theoretical implementation of the ideas behind
Aumann’s strong equilibrium concept.
Aumann’s strong equilibrium concept is defined as follows. As a preliminary we denote a coali-
tion as any subset S of players in N ; hence, a coalition is any S ⊂ N . is includes the empty
coalition as well as the “grand” coalitionN itself. In a non-cooperative game (A,π ), for any coali-
tion S ⊂ N and strategy profile a ∈ A we denote by aS the S-restriction of a defined by (aj )j ∈S and
by aN \S its complement (ak )k<S .
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Now, in a non-cooperative game (A,π ) a strategy tuple a ∈ A is a strong equilibrium if for every
(non-empty) coalition of players S ⊂ N and every coordinated strategic deviation bS = (bi )i∈S ∈
AS =
∏
i∈S Ai it holds that
πi
(
aN \S ,bS
)
6 πi (a) for all i ∈ S (13)
Next we introduce the strong stability concept put forward by Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2005). e next definition essentially transposes strong equilibrium conditions to network forma-
tion situations.
Definition 4.10 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and consider the corresponding Myerson
model Γφ = (Am ,πm).
(i) A network д′ ∈ GN can be obtained from network д ∈ GN through the coordinated actions
of coalition S ⊂ N if д′ = д + h+ − h−, where h+ ⊂ дS = {ij | i, j ∈ S} and h− ⊂ ∪i∈S Li (д).
(ii) A network д ∈ GN is strongly stable if for every coalition S ⊂ N and every network д′
that is obtainable from network д through coordinated actions from coalition S it holds that
φi (д′) > φi for some player i ∈ S implies that there exists some other player j ∈ S with
φ j (д′) < φ j (д).
It should be remarked that Dua and Mutuswami (1997) introduced a slightly different definition
of strong stability. ey consider that all members of S need to be made strictly beer off for
a deviation to be successful. In the definition used by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) a
deviation needs to make all members of S to be at least as well off and making one member strictly
beer off.
Strong equilibrium is a very demanding concept and these equilibria do not exist in many game
theoretic decision situations. Similarly, the notion of strong stability is equally demanding, resulting
that such networks rather unlikely exist. e next example illustrates these issues and introduces
the notion of costly link formation that will be explored further in the next two subsections.
Example 4.11 (Costly trade networks)
is example of a Walrasian trade network has been introduced seminally in Jackson and Was
(2002) and further developed in Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) andGilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi
(2011). It considers an economy of n players who trade goods through connection paths. ere
are two commodities X and Y and all players are endowed with a Codd-Douglas utility function
u(x,y) = √xy. All players are assumed to have a commodity endowment of either (1, 0) or (0, 1)
with an equal probability of 12 .
Players can trade with any other player that they are connected with, directly or indirectly. Hence,
there emerge complete markets in each of the components. So, for n = 5 a network д = {12, 23, 45}
generates two components and two markets, namely 123 separated from 45. Additional links, there-
fore, not always contribute to the extent of these markets: д′ = {12, 23, 13, 45} results in exactly the
same markets 123 and 45.
e cost c of forming any link ij is uniform and set at c > 12 . e costs of the formation of the trade
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network are divided equally among the members of a market, being a component of the network.
e network payoff function φ is now defined as the expected net benefits from participating in the
generated market structure. is can be developed as follows.
First, consider the case of a market of the size two. ere is a probability of 12 that these two players
have opposite endowments and a probability of 12 that they have the same endowment. Hence, the
probability of trade is 12 resulting in a Walrasian allocation of ( 12 , 12 ) resulting in φ = 12 ·
√
1
4 − 12c =
1
4 − 12c < 0.
More generally consider a market (component) of k players. e probability of r players have en-
dowment (0, 1) and (k − r ) having endowment (1, 0) is now
kCr
(
1
2
)k − r · ( 12 )r = kCr ( 12 )k .
e expected gross payoff from trade is now given by
r
2k ·
(
k − r
r
) 1
2
+
k−r
2k ·
( r
k − r
) 1
2
=
√
r (k − r )
k
Hence, taking into account that there are exactly k−1 links required to build a market for k players,
the resulting net payoff from this trade network is given by
φ =
1
k · 2k
[
k−1∑
r=1
kCr
√
r (k − r )
]
− (k − 1)c
k
.
Turning to n = k = 3 it can easily be computed that the net benefits to each player are given by
φ =
√
2
4
− 2c
3
> 0 for 12 < c <
3
√
2
8 .
For n = k = 3 and the given link formation cost range there are two pairwise stable networks,
namely the connected network and the (inefficient) empty network. e empty network is bilat-
erally stable, since creating a single link between two players is not beneficial for the given link
formation cost range. On the other hand, the empty network is not strongly stable. Indeed, if all
three players coordinate they would create two links to make a beneficial market among them.
is also shows that the connected component based on two links among the three players is
strongly stable. 
4.2 Two-sided link formation costs
e previous example that illustrates the strong stability concept also introduced the idea that there
are normally link formation costs. In this particular case the costs of network formation are borne
equally among all players that participate in the network. is signifies a collective approach to the
allocation of network formation costs. It is more natural to assume that players only bear the costs
of the links that they are part of.
In this section I develop the idea of link formation costs further. In particular, I consider a
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modification of the Myerson model where the “intent to form links” is costly in the sense that
approaching another player to form a link involves explicit investment of time, effort and energy.
Hence, the act of sending a signal is costly. However, if the other player does not reciprocate and
the link does not materialise, the player choosing to “reach out” still incurs this cost.9 is means
that if player i ∈ N contemplates building a link ij with player j ∈ N and sends a message ℓi j = 1,
she incurs a cost of ci j > 0. On the other hand, ℓi j = 0 signifies no link is aempted to be made,
which imposes no costs on player i.
Formally, a link formation cost structure can therefore be represented by a function c : N ×N →
R+ where c(i, j) = ci j > 0 is the cost that player i ∈ N incurs for sending a message to player
j ∈ N , using the convention that c(i, i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Hence, player i incurs a cost ci j > 0 when
communicating to player j that she wants to form a link. In particular, this cost refers to the effort
to respond to messages sent by others. Obviously, if ci j = 0, then there is no cost to communicating
and sending messages.
is construction introduces the consent model with two-sided link formation costs as defined as
a modification of the (basic) Myerson model Γφ given as a non-cooperative game Γ
a
φ (c) = (Aa ,πa),
where player i’s strategy set is given byAai = A
m
i and player i’s payoff for any strategy tuple ℓ ∈ Aa
is given by
πai (ℓ) = φi (д(ℓ)) −
∑
j,i
ℓi j · ci j = πmi (ℓ) −
∑
j,i
ℓi j · ci j , (14)
where φ : GN → RN is the network payoff function representing the gross benefits from network
formation without taking into account the costs of link formation.
Our first result develops a complete characterisation of the Nash equilibria in the consent model
with two-sided link formation costs. Part of this equivalence theorem was already stated without
proof in Gilles and Sarangi (2010) and as stated here is taken from Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi
(2012). ere are some preliminaries that need to be developed before stating the main assertion.
Definition 4.12 Let φ be a network payoff function on player set N and let c : N × N → R+ a link
formation cost structure on N . Furthermore, let Γaφ (c) = (Aa ,πa) be the associated consent model with
two-sided link formation costs.
A strategy tuple ℓ ∈ Aa = Am is non-superfluous in the consent model with two-sided link formation
costs Γaφ = (Aa ,πa) if for all pairs of players i, j ∈ N , ℓi j = 1 if and only if ℓji = 1.
We call a non-superfluous strategy tuple ℓ ∈ Aa that is a Nash equilibrium a non-superfluousNash
equilibrium.
e main theorem in this two-sided approach to link building costs provides a complete character-
isation of the networks that are supported by Nash equilibria in the consent model with two-sided
link formation costs. Essentially all such networks are exactly the strong link deletion proof net-
works for a network payoff function that takes account of those link formation costs. For a proof
od the next theorem I refer to the appendix of this survey.
9ismodel of two-sided link formation costswas introduced in Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2006) and developed
further by Gilles and Sarangi (2010) and Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2012).
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eorem 4.13 Let φ be a network payoff function on player set N and let c : N × N → R+ a link
formation cost structure on N . Furthermore, let Γaφ (c) = (Aa ,πa) be the associated consent model with
two-sided link formation costs.
en for every network д ∈ GN the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) Network д is supported by a Nash equilibrium of the consent model with two-sided link forma-
tion costs Γaφ (c).
(b) Network д is supported by a non-superfluous Nash equilibrium of the consent model with two-
sided link formation costs Γaφ (c).
(c) Network д is strong link deletion proof with regard to the network payoff function φa : GN →
R
N given by
φai (д) = φi (д) −
∑
j ∈Ni (д)
ci j (15)
eorem 4.13 provides a complete and detailed characterisation of the set of all Nash equilibria of
the consent model with two-sided link formation costs. Furthermore, assertion of eorem 4.13(c)
generalises the insight that the class of M-networks in the basic Myerson model is exactly the class
of strong deletion proof networks under network payoff function φ.
As asserted in the proof of eorem 4.13(b), each Nash equilibrium network is actually sup-
ported by a unique non-superfluous strategy profile if the cost structure is non-trivial in the sense
that all link formation costs are positive. Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2012) also discuss that
there actually exist superfluous Nash equilibria if costs of link formation are zero for one of the
players. I reproduce the simple example given there below.
Example 4.14 (Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi, 2012)
Consider the binary network formation situation with N = {1, 2} and the network payoff function
given by φ1(д0) = φ2(д0) = φ1(дN ) = 0 and φ2(дN ) = 1. Link formation costs are given by c12 = 0
and c21 = 1. Hence, we can derive that under two-sided link formation costs that φ
a
i (д0) = 0 as well
as φai (дN ) = 0, for i = 1, 2.
Clearly, the empty networkд0 is both (strong) link deletion proof for the net payoff function φ
a and
supported by the superfluous Nash equilibrium characterised by ℓ12 = 1 and ℓ21 = 0. Of course, д0
is also supported as a Nash equilibrium through its non-superfluous strategy profile ℓ012 = ℓ
0
21 = 0
in (Aa ,πa). 
4.3 One-sided link formation costs
Next I investigate a network formation process under a one-sided cost structure. In this approach,
one of the two linking players acts as the initiator and sends an initiationmessage to the other. If the
other player, called the responder , chooses to reciprocate positively, the link materialises; otherwise,
not. is link formation process has a similar nature as the process considered in Bala and Goyal
(2000), except that in our approach the responder has to consent to the formation of the link, while
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in Bala-Goyal’s model, this is not required. ere the initiator can create a link with the respondent
in the absence of consent.
e decision making process is more complex than that under two-sided link formation costs.
Consequently, the action set has to be constructed differently. In particular, for each player i, we
introduce a strategy set given by
Abi =
{ (li j , ri j )j,i  li j , ri j ∈ {0, 1} } . (16)
is means that player i chooses to act as an initiator in forming a link with j if she initiates a
message to j indicated as li j = 1. In this case, player j acts as the respondent and responds positively
to this initiative if rji = 1. On the other hand, player j rejects the initiated link with i if rji = 0.
erefore, a link is only established if the initiated link is accepted, i.e., if li j = rji = 1. is is
formalised as follows.
Let Ab =
∏
i∈N Abi be the set of such communication profiles. Given the link formation process
set out above, for any profile (l, r ) ∈ Ab , the resulting network is now given by
дb (l, r ) = {ij ∈ дN | li j = rji = 1}. (17)
To delineate the one-sidedmodel from the two-sidedmodel, it is preferred to use a different notation
for the incurred link formation costs. Instead, I introduce the function γ : N × N → R+ as the one-
sided link formation cost structure. Here, when player i initiates a link with player j—represented
by li j = 1—she incurs a cost of γi j > 0, regardless of whether the initialised link is accepted by j
or not. On the other hand, we assume that responding to a link initialisation message is costless,
i.e., player j incurs no cost in responding to any message ℓi j sent by player i in the link formation
process.
For a given network payoff functionφ onN this now results in the following net payoff function
for player i:
πbi (l, r ) = φi
(
дb (l, r )
)
−
∑
j,i
li j · γi j . (18)
Formally, let φ be a network payoff function on N and let γ : N × N → R+ be a given one-sided
link formation cost structure. en we refer to the non-cooperative game in strategic form Γbφ (γ ) =
(Ab ,πb ) as the consent model of network formation with one-sided link formation costs.
Nash equilibria of the consent model with one-sided link formation costs. As before, we
can now introduce a non-superfluous strategy tuples in the consent model with one-sided link
formation costs:
Definition 4.15 Let φ be a network payoff function onN and letγ : N ×N → R+ be a given one-sided
link formation cost structure. Consider the corresponding consent model with one-sided link formation
costs Γbφ (γ ) = (Ab ,πb ).
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en a strategy profile (l, r ) ∈ Ab is non-superfluous if for all pairs i, j ∈ N it holds that
li j = 1 implies that rji = 1 as well as lji = ri j = 0, and (19)
ri j = 1 implies that lji = 1 as well as li j = rji = 0. (20)
Unlike for the consent model with two-sided link formation costs, each network is no longer sup-
ported by a unique non-superfluous strategy profile. Indeed, it depends on who of the two players
involved initiates and who responds in the link formation process.
On the other hand, under a non-superfluous strategy profile, only one player bears the estab-
lishment cost of each existing link, and every initialisation is responded to positively. As a first step
in the analysis of this one-sided approach, I explore the relationship between the Nash equilibria
of the two-sided and the one-sided model. Secondly, I present a full characterisation of the Nash
equilibria of the one-sided model in terms of network stability properties. ese results are taken
from Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2011).
e main question to be considered here is whether there is a network payoff function which
would provide equivalence betweenNash equilibria of the one-sidedmodel and strong link deletion
proofness with regard to a payoff function in a similar fashion as eorem 4.13 for two-sided link
formation costs. In particular, I follow efficiency logic and consider a payoff function which only
assigns link formation costs to the player with the lower cost of link formation. If link formation
costs are equal, a tie-breaking rule is applied.
Let Ωi (д) = {j ∈ Ni (д) | γi j < γji or γi j = γji , i < j} ⊂ Ni (д) be the potential links that player
i should finance based on incurring the lowest link formation costs. e corresponding payoff
function φb is defined for i ∈ N by
φbi (д) = φi (д) −
∑
j ∈Ωi (д)
γi j
given the network payoff function φ representing benefits without taking into account costs of link
formation. We can show the following implication, which proof is relegated to Appendix A.4.
eorem 4.16 Let φ be a network payoff function on N and let γ : N ×N → R+ be a given one-sided
link formation cost structure. If network д ∈ GN is strong link deletion proof for the net payoff function
φb , thenд can be supported by a non-superfluous Nash equilibrium in the consent model with one-sided
link formation costs Γbφ (γ ) = (Ab ,πb ).
e converse of eorem 4.16 does not hold as shown by the following counter-example.
Example 4.17 Consider the minimal binary network formation situation with N = {1, 2} and
network payoffs given by φ1(д0) = φ2(д0) = 0, φ1(дN ) = 2 and φ2(дN ) = 10. Link formation costs
are given by γ12 = 5 and γ21 = 7.
Hence for i = 1, 2, φbi (д0) = 0, φb1 (дN ) = −3 and φb2 (дN ) = 3. Clearly, the complete networkдN is not
link deletion proof for the network payoff function φb , since player 1 would benefit from severing
the unique link 12.
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However, there is a Nash equilibriumof the one-sided consent model Γbφ (γ ) = (Ab ,πb ) that supports
the complete network дN : l12 = 0; r12 = 1; l21 = 1; r21 = 0. 
One might expect that a network payoff function that assigns a link initiator role to the player with
the higher marginal net benefits as a result of formation of the link in question might resolve the
issue of characterising the supported equilibrium networks in Γbφ (γ ) = (Ab ,πb ). Below it is shown
that this is actually not the case.
Example 4.18 Consider a situation with three players, N = {1, 2, 3}. e following table gives
the benefits for each of the three players in the case of the formation of one of only three relevant
networks:
Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д)
{12} 10 10 0
{13} 10 0 10
{12, 13} 15 20 20
All other networks generate no benefits to any of the three players, i.e., φi (д) = 0 for all other
networks д not listed in the table.
Consider the following one-sided link formation cost structure: γ12 = γ13 = 9, γ21 = 10, γ31 = 10,
and γ23 = γ32 = 10. Within this context, player 1 has the highest marginal net benefit from forming
links 12 as well as 13, namely φ1({12}) − γ12 = φ1({13}) − γ13 = 1, while the other players have no
positive marginal benefits from forming links 12 and 13.
Now, the network {12, 13} is not link deletion proof for the network payoff function that is based
on the property that the player with the highest net marginal benefit is assumed to finance the
formation of a link. Indeed, player 1—who has the highest net marginal benefits from both links—
has a negative net return from forming network {12, 13} and would prefer to sever one of the two
links to increase her net benefit to 1.
On the other hand, {12, 13} is supported by a non-superfluous Nash equilibrium strategy profile
under one-sided link formation costs with l21 = r12 = 1 and l31 = r13 = 1. 
ese examples show that the problem of finding a reasonable payoff function that completely
characterises all Nash equilibria of the one-sided consent model in terms of network stability re-
mains open. e issues are such that it can be argued that there is actually no reasonable network
payoff function that characterises all supported equilibrium networks in the consent model under
one-sided link formation costs.
Multi-stage network formation under one-sided link formation costs. Here I examine
whether certain other approaches can resolve the coordination and free riding issues that are indi-
cated in the discussion of the converse ofeorem 4.16 above.10 In particular, I consider a two-stage
10is discussion requires knowledge of multi-stage, sequential games and the notion of sub game perfection. is
discussion can be skipped without any difficulty. For more elaborate discussion of multi-stage and sequential games I
refer to Osborne (2004), Harrington (2008) and Maschler, Solan, and Zamir (2013).
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network formation process to restore equivalence between equilibria of that model under one-sided
costs and strong link deletion proofness with respect to some well-constructed network payoff
function. is is motivated by the fact that oen sequential decision making solves coordination
problems. With this in mind, consider the following natural two-stage process:
(i) In the first stage, every players i ∈ N initiates links by selecting initiationmessages (li j )j,i .
(ii) In the second stage, all players respond to links initiated in the first stage and select
(ri j : li j = 1)j,i .
e question is whether the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game are strong link deletion
proof with regard to φb . We show that this is not necessarily the case.
Example 4.19 Reconsider the simple binary linking situation in Example 4.17. We showed earlier
that the complete network дN = {12} is not (strong) link deletion proof for the net payoff function
φb but that there is a Nash equilibrium communication profile of the one-sided model that supports
it, namely, l12 = 0; r12 = 1; l21 = 1; r21 = 0.
We now show that in the two-stage network formation process described above, this communica-
tion profile is subgame perfect as well. Consider the reduced game in the second stage, given that
l12 = 0 and l21 = 1 has been chosen in the first stage. In normal form it can now be represented as
the matrix game
r21
r12
0 1
0 0,−7 0,−7
1 2, 3 2, 3
ere are two Nash equilibria in this game, one of which is r12 = 1 and r21 = 0. is is exactly the
second part of the indicated communication profile. us, it is easy to establish now that the given
communication profile is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage link formation
process. 
e reason why sequential decision making cannot resolve the coordination problem is that here
the problem stems from costs not being transferable. Complete transferability of costs and benefits
would take us into the framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and, in particular, Bloch and Jackson
(2006, 2007).
A formal comparison of one-sided and two-sided link formation costs. We now return
to the discussion of the consent model with one-sided versus the consent model with two-sided
link formation costs. In particular, we develop a formal comparison of the Nash equilibria under
two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.
Since the models have different philosophical bases, we must make some simplifying assump-
tions to enable a more formal comparison. In particular, we have to address how the two different
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link formation cost formulations are related. is simply requires us to formulate the one-sided
cost structure γ in terms of the two-sided cost structure c. Hence, we consider γ to be a particular
functional form of c.
We look at two simplified cases that facilitate this comparison.
Case A: e initiator bears all. Suppose that the initiator in the model with one-sided costs
bears both his cost and the cost of the responder in the context of the two-sided consent model. So,
initiation is tantamount to bearing the total cost of link formation, i.e., γi j = ci j + cji for all i , j .
Benefits described by φ remain individualised and are not transferable.
In this case, it is quite obvious that the Nash equilibria of the two models are not comparable,
which is shown in the next simple example.
Example 4.20 Consider again a binary link formation situation with N = {1, 2} and φi (дN ) = 51,
φi (д0) = 0, i = 1, 2. Moreover, let c12 = c21 = 50. Hence, γ12 = γ21 = 100. en, дN = {12} is
supported by a Nash equilibria of the two-sided model, namely through ℓ12 = ℓ21 = 1. But there is
no Nash equilibrium in the one-sided model that would support it because no one would be willing
to pay a cost of 100 in order to sustain this link.
Next, modify the situation to let φ1(дN ) = 12, φ2(дN ) = 2, φi (д0) = 0, i = 1, 2 and c12 = c21 = 5.
Hence, γ12 = γ21 = 10. en, дN = {12} is now supported by a Nash equilibrium of the one-sided
model, namely through l12 = r21 = 1, l21 = r12 = 0. e strategy supporting this network is not a
Nash equilibrium in the two-sided model. 
Case B: A sunk cost formulation. Next, we consider the case in which the link formation
costs are not transferable and that the initiator has to bear only his own cost. is corresponds to
a scenario where the costs of the responding party are sunk and, thus, not relevant to the decision
making process.
Hence, we assume that γi j = ci j for all i , j . In this case, it can be shown that networks sup-
ported by Nash equilibria of the two two-sided model are also supported by some Nash equilibrium
of the one-sided model, while the converse does not hold. For a proof of the next theorem I refer to
Appendix A.5.
eorem 4.21 Let φ be a network payoff function on player set N and let c : N ×N → R+ a two-sided
link formation cost structure on N .
If a network д ∈ GN is supported by a Nash equilibrium of the consent model with two-sided link
formation costs Γaφ (c), then there exists a non-superfluous Nash equilibrium supporting network д in
the consent model with one-sided link formation costs Γbφ (c), i.e., for one-sided link formation cost
structure γ given by γi j = ci j for all i, j ∈ N .
We show that the converse of eorem 4.21 does not hold.
Example 4.22 Consider again the binary link formation situation with N = {1, 2}. Furthermore,
assume now that φ1(д0) = φ2(д0) = 0, φ1(дN ) = 6 and φ2(дN ) = 4. Let two-sided costs of link
formation be uniform, given by ci j = 5 for all i, j ∈ N .
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e complete network дN = {12} initiated by player 1 is supported by a Nash equilibrium in the
one-sided model for γi j = ci j . But the strategy tuple ℓ12 = ℓ21 = 1 in the two-sided model that
supports this network is not a Nash equilibrium in that model. 
is discussion shows that one-sided link formation processes require a very careful analysis and
do not necessarily result in very delineated conclusions. is also has been pointed out for the
equilibrium networks resulting from the Bala-Goyal one-sided link formation process in absence
to consent. Numerous studies have investigated the multitude of equilibrium networks that result
under those conditions.
5 Trust and network formation
e analysis of network formation under mutual consent, in the presence of link formation costs
or not, shows that there is no clear pathway to the formation of a non-trivial network through
straightforward best response rationality as reflected in the Nash equilibrium concept. is can be
summarised as follows:
Summary 5.1 Let φ be a network payoff function on player set N . en the following insights hold:
(i) e empty network д0 =  is an M-network in the basic Myerson model Γφ .
(ii) Let c : N × N → R+ be a link formation cost structure. en the empty network д0 =  is
supported by a Nash equilibrium in the consent model with two-sided link formation costs
Γ
a
φ (c).
(iii) Let γ : N × N → R+ be a link formation cost structure. en the empty network д0 = 
is supported by a Nash equilibrium in the consent model with one-sided link formation costs
Γ
b
φ (γ ).
From these insights it is clear that a pathway to the formation of a non-trivial network under mu-
tual consent in a non-cooperative framework can only be established through the introduction of
behaviour that goes beyond the standard best response conception. Gilles and Sarangi (2010) con-
sidered exactly such an alternative perspective by incorporating trusting behaviour into an equilib-
rium concept in the Myerson model and its refinements. is refers to the fundamental idea that
“trust builds networks”.
Incorporating trust in a behavioural standard. I discuss a game theoretic concept to describe
the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication leading to rea-
sonably restrictive sets of non-trivial stable networks. Within the consent model under two-sided
link formation costs Gilles and Sarangi (2010) developed a belief-based stability concept denoted as
monadic stability for understanding a purely non-cooperative process of network formation based
on trusting behaviour.
Monadic stability imposes minimal informational requirements. Unlike other models of strate-
gic network formation, players need not be aware of the payoffs associated with every network.
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For any given network д ∈ GN to emerge in such a seing, a player is required to know the payoffs
associated with any change (creation or deletion) only involving their own direct links ij ∈ Li . We
amend Myerson’s consent game such that, based on their information, players form simple, my-
opic beliefs about the direct benefits other players will receive from establishing links with them.
According to these myopic beliefs, each player i ∈ N assumes that another player j ∈ N is willing
to form a new link with i if j stands to benefit from it in the prevailing network. Similarly i also
assumes that j will break an existing link ij in the prevailing network if j does not benefit from
having this link. us, in this process player i assumes that all other links in the prevailing network
remain unchanged.
us, these beliefs are indeed “myopic” in the sense that they only pertain to direct effects of
the addition or removal of a link in the network. In this regard these beliefs disregard higher order
effects on the payoffs of all players in the network due to the addition or removal of such a link. As
such these behavioural standards reflect a bounded form of rationality in decision making.
Such simple, myopic beliefs capture the idea that network formation primarily occurs between
acquaintanceswith sufficiently large an amount of information about each other to assess first order
effects of network changes.11 is concept can also be viewed as a normal form implementation
of the self-confirming equilibrium concept introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1993) within the
seing of the Myerson model and its variants.
One can assess these myopic belief systems as reflecting a certain form of “confidence” on the
part of each player to engage in communication to form links with other players that have an
obvious (first-order) benefit from the addition of such a link. is confidence suffices to form non-
trivial social networks. As stated, a certain commonality is assumed among the players in order
to formulate such common priors and beliefs on which this confidence is founded. In this regard
we assume that players are acquaintances and build relationships through beliefs about actions
undertaken by other players.12
5.1 Monadic stability
In this section we introduce a non-cooperative game theoretic equilibrium concept for network for-
mation models that incorporates a form of boundedly rational anticipation or “myopic confidence”
into the process of link formation. is equilibriumconcept—denoted asmonadic stability—captures
the idea that social networks are mainly formed between acquaintances who already have some
knowledge about each other. Hence, our main modelling assumption is that stable social networks
arise only from links between a priori acquaintances and not among random strangers.
We found our modelling principles on the fundamental hypothesis that trust is mainly built be-
tween acquaintances. at social relations are mainly formed between acquaintances is confirmed
empirically by Wellman, Carrington, and Hall (1988) using data from the East York area. is prin-
ciple also forms the foundation of the model in Brueckner (2006), whomodels friendship as building
11Another reason for choosing a simple set of beliefs was to understand the role beliefs have in supporting networks
with desirable properties.
12It is clear that this approach is akin to the notion of unilateral stability introduced before. A comparison of monadic
stability with unilateral stability is, therefore, called for. is is further developed here as well.
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links between players chosen from a given set of acquaintances.
In the context of our model, it is assumed that players are acquainted with each other without
explicitly modelling how they got acquainted with each other. We believe that such acquaintance-
ship gives rise to some initial, status quo networkдwhich need not be stable in any sense. Moreover,
due to this assumed closeness, we might reasonably hypothesise that each player has knowledge
about the payoffs of the other players who are or could be potentially involved in a direct link with
her. is enables her to formulate expectations about how the other players will respond to her
link proposals.
Under monadic stability, a player assumes that other players are likely to respond affirmatively
to a proposal to form a link if the addition of this link is profitable for them, i.e., only the implications
of direct links affect the expectations. Note that since further consequences are not taken into
account, this introduces a rather myopic form of forward looking behaviour. is limited form of
farsightedness thus models the anticipation of a player in a very specific manner: ese beliefs
assume that other players will decide the “correct” action when asked whether to form a link or not
based only on that link building the basis for trust among them. Also, such a belief system provides
a fair degree of realism to the model.
We now formalise these myopic belief systems for the consent model under two-sided link
formation costs.
Defining monadic stability. roughout we assume there is a given network payoff function
φ : GN → RN and we impose a two-sided link formation cost structure c = (ci j )i, j ∈N . Based on
this data, consider the corresponding consent model under two-sided link formation costs Γaφ (c) =
(Aa ,πa). We can introduce specific belief systems in this seing that represent the trusting be-
havioural principle as discussed above.
Definition 5.2 Let ℓ ∈ Aa = Am be an arbitrary communication profile resulting in networkд = д(ℓ).
For every player i ∈ N we define i’smonadic belief system concerning ℓ as a communication profile
ℓi⋆ ∈ Aa given by
(i) for every j , i with ij ∈ д let
• ℓi⋆ji = 0 if φ j (д − ij) + cji > φ j (д) and
• ℓi⋆ji = 1 if φ j (д − ij) + cji 6 φ j (д);
(ii) for every j , i with ij < д let
• ℓi⋆ji = 0 if φ j (д + ij) − cji < φ j (д) and
• ℓi⋆ji = 1 if φ j (д + ij) − cji > φ j (д);
(iii) and for all j,k ∈ N with j , i , k let ℓi⋆
jk
= ℓjk .
Amonadic belief system reflects that a player believes that other players are myopically selfish and
will act in their myopic self-interest. Hence, links are consented to if that directly benefits the other
player and are refused if deleting that link benefits the other player.
Now monadic stability simply requires that each player acts rationally in view of these beliefs.
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Definition 5.3 Let φ and c be given with the corresponding consent model under two-sided link for-
mation costs Γaφ (c) = (Aa ,πa).
(a) Anetworkд ∈ GN isweaklymonadically stable for (φ, c) if there exists some communication
profile ℓ ∈ Aa withд = д(ℓ) such that for every i ∈ N : ℓi ∈ Aai is a best response to her monadic
beliefs ℓi⋆−i ∈ Aa−i for payoff function πa ; thus,
φi
(
ℓ
′
i ,д(ℓi⋆−i )
)
6 φi
(
д(ℓi , ℓi⋆−i )
)
(21)
for all ℓ′i ∈ Aai .
(b) A network д ∈ GN ismonadically stable for (φ, c) if there exists some communication profile
ℓ ∈ Aa with д = д(ℓ) such that for every i ∈ N : ℓi ∈ Aai is a best response to her monadic
beliefs ℓi⋆−i ∈ Aa−i for payoff function πa and player i’s monadic belief system ℓi⋆ is confirmed
in the sense that for every j , i it holds that ℓi⋆ji = ℓji .
Weakmonadic stability of a network is founded on the principle that every player i ∈ N anticipates—
as captured by her (monadic) expectations about direct links—that other players will respond my-
opically selfishly to her aempts to form a link with them. Note that ℓ−i is fully replaced by ℓi⋆−i in
the standard best-response formulation of Nash equilibrium for player i and is therefore irrelevant
for the decision making process of i. Hence, a player j will agree to form a link with i when it is
myopically profitable for j to form this link. Similarly, unprofitable direct links initiated by i will
be turned down.
Monadic stability strengthens the above concept by requiring that the beliefs of each player
are confirmed in the resulting equilibrium. Hence, monadic stability imposes a self-confirming
condition on the weakly monadic equilibrium. is describes the situation that all players are fully
satisfied with their beliefs; the observations that they make about the resulting network confirm
their beliefs about the other players’ payoffs. is can be explained as the outcome of a process
of updating one’s initial beliefs. is refers to the notion of a specific self-confirming equilibrium
based on the monadic belief system in the context of consent model with two-sided link formation
costs. e notion of self-confirming equilibriumwas seminally developed by Fudenberg and Levine
(1993) in the context of extensive form non-cooperative games.
To delineate the twomonadic stability concepts for networks, we discuss a three player example.
is example shows that the set of monadically stable networks is usually a strict subset of the
weakly monadically stable networks.
Example 5.4 Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and assume uniform link formation costs with ci j = 1 for all
i, j ∈ N . Let the network payoff function φ be given in the table below:
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Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0 Mw
д1 = {12} 0 1 0
д2 = {13} 0 0 3
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} 3 0 0
д5 = {12, 23} 1 3 3
д6 = {13, 23} 2 2 5 Mw
д7 = дN 3 5 6 Mw andM
is table identifieswhether the network in question is weakmonadically stable—indicated byMw—
or whether it is monadically stable—indicated by M .
Within this example we now consider some of the networks given and analyse their stability prop-
erties.
Network д0: We show that this network is weakly monadically stable for a supporting communi-
cation profile that is superfluous. Indeed, select ℓ0 = ( (1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0) ) ∈ Aa with д(ℓ0) =
д0 = . Observe here that player 1 incurs link formation costs with πa1 (ℓ0) = −2, while
πa2 (ℓ0) = πa3 (ℓ0) = 0. en we can determine the monadic belief systems for all players as
ℓ
1⋆
0 = (−, (1, 0), (1, 0) )
ℓ
2⋆
0 = ((0, 1),−, (0, 0) )
ℓ
3⋆
0 = ((1, 0), (0, 0),− )
It should be emphasised that in this case player 1 believes that both other players are willing
to make links with her, because there are direct benefits from forming such links. However,
the other players believe that player 1 will not aempt to make a link with them, because she
has no direct (net) benefits from doing so. is refers to a classical coordination problem.
Now we determine that the best responses for all players are given by
• β1
(
ℓ1⋆0
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ1⋆0 for player 1.
• β2
(
ℓ2⋆0
)
= (0, 0) is the unique best response to ℓ2⋆0 for player 2.
• β3
(
ℓ3⋆0
)
= (0, 0) is the unique best response to ℓ3⋆0 for player 3.
is confirms that д0 is indeed weakly monadically stable for ℓ0. However, д0 is not monadi-
cally stable, since in the communication profile ℓ0, player 1’s beliefs are not confirmed. She
expects the other two players to be willing to form links with her, although they do not do
so.
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Network д5: is network is neither weakly monadically stable, nor monadically stable. e non-
superfluous communication profile ℓ5 = ( (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1) ) is an obvious candidate to sup-
port this network. For this profile we compute that
ℓ
1⋆
5 = (−, (1, 1), (1, 1) )
ℓ
2⋆
5 = ((1, 0),−, (0, 1) )
ℓ
3⋆
5 = ((1, 1), (1, 1),− )
is results into the following best response configuration:
• β1
(
ℓ1⋆5
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ1⋆5 for player 1.
• β2
(
ℓ2⋆5
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ2⋆5 for player 2.
• β3
(
ℓ3⋆5
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ3⋆5 for player 3.
From this it is clear that д5 cannot be supported by ℓ5. is illustrates that weak monadic
stability requires selecting a best response to a specific set of beliefs for each player i ∈ N .
Without such a restriction on the beliefs it would be possible to support any strategy as
weakly monadic stable. Moreover, observe that players only form beliefs about the behaviour
of their acquaintances with regard to direct links, making it myopic but realistic. In fact,
because of this, it is possible that monadically stable equilibria do not exist.
Finally, we can complete the argument by checking that other communication profiles can
be ruled out in similar fashion.
Network д6: We argue that this network is weakly monadically stable as well. We can show that
д6 is supported by the action tuple ℓ6 = ( (0, 1), (1, 1, ), (1, 1) ). Again we compute
ℓ
1⋆
6 = (−, (1, 1), (1, 1) )
ℓ
2⋆
6 = ((1, 1),−, (1, 1) )
ℓ
3⋆
6 = ((0, 1), (1, 1),− )
Note here that player 1 is indifferent between д6 and д7 in terms of her net payoff π
a . us,
in the computation of ℓ2⋆6 we use the bias of player 1 towards having more links rather than
fewer in player 2’s belief system.
is results into the following best response configuration:
• β1
(
ℓ1⋆6
)
= { (0, 1), (1, 1) } is the set of best responses to ℓ1⋆6 for player 1, i.e., (0, 1) and
(1, 1) are both best responses for this player.
• β2
(
ℓ2⋆6
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ2⋆6 for player 2.
• β3
(
ℓ3⋆6
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ3⋆6 for player 3.
is shows that ℓ6 is indeed supported as a weak monadically stable communication profile.
On the other hand, д6 is not monadically stable, since the beliefs of player 2 are not confirmed.
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Network д7: First, we claim that this network is strictly pairwise stable. Strong link deletion
proofness follows trivially from the payoffs listed. Indeed, the net payoffs in other networks
(д0, . . . ,д6) are at most the net payoff in д7 for all players. Second, strict link addition proof-
ness is trivially satisfied since there are no links that are not part of д7 = дN .
Furthermore, the complete networkд7 = дN is weakly monadically stable. We claim thatд7 is
supported by the only communication profile supporting this network, ℓ7 = ( (1, 1), (1, 1, ), (1, 1) ).
We can determine that the monadic belief systems are given by
ℓ1⋆7 = (−, (1, 1), (1, 1) )
ℓ2⋆7 = ((1, 1),−, (1, 1) )
ℓ3⋆7 = ((1, 1), (1, 1),− )
From this we conclude that
• β1
(
ℓ1⋆7
)
= { (0, 1), (1, 1) } is the set of best responses to ℓ1⋆7 for player 1.
• β2
(
ℓ2⋆7
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ2⋆7 for player 2.
• β3
(
ℓ3⋆7
)
= (1, 1) is the unique best response to ℓ3⋆7 for player 3.
So, ℓ7 is indeed a best response profile with regard to the generated monadic belief systems.
Hence, д7 is indeed weakly monadically stable.
Finally, all players’ monadic belief systems are confirmed here. So, in fact, д7 is monadically
stable.
In this example, it is made clear that the introducedmonadic belief systems require only that players
use minimal information about each other’s payoffs to formulate appropriate expectations about
each other’s linking behaviour. Indeed, monadic stability only considers players to use first-order
effects of forming new links and deleting existing links to formulate their monadic beliefs. 
is example clarifies the relationship between the notion ofweakmonadic stability and themonadic
stability concept. Using the insights from this example we now provide a more general characteri-
sation.
Proposition 5.5 Let the network payoff function φ and the link formation cost structure c be given.
Every monadically stable network д ∈ GN for (φ, c) is weakly monadically stable such that the sup-
porting monadic belief system ℓд is non-superfluous in the sense that ℓ
д
i j = ℓ
д
ji for all pairs i, j ∈ N .
Proof. Let д ∈ GN be monadically stable and let action tuple ℓд ∈ Aa support д as such. Suppose
that ij < д with ℓ
д
i j = 1 and ℓ
д
ji = 0. en from the property that ℓ
д
i ∈ Aai is a best response to the
belief system ℓ
д i⋆
−i it can be concluded that ℓ
д
ji = 1 implies that ℓ
д i⋆
ji = 1. But this would then imply
that ℓ
д
ji , ℓ
д i⋆
ji , violating the monadic stability self-confirmation condition.
e reverse of the assertion of Proposition 5.5 is not true. Simple examples can be constructed in
which weakly monadically stable networks exist that satisfy the stated property, but which are not
monadically stable.
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A few comments regarding the relationship betweenweakmonadic stability and network-based
stability concepts are in order here. First, weakly monadically stable networks are not necessarily
strong link deletion proof or link addition proof. Second, a network that is strong link deletion proof
as well as link addition proof is not necessarily weaklymonadically stable. We refer to networkд6 in
Example 5.4, which isweaklymonadically stable, but not link addition proof. e other comparisons
can also be shown by properly constructed counterexamples.
An equivalence result. e main insight from this approach is that trust indeed builds very
strong networks. is is exemplified by the equivalence of the class of monadically datable and
strictly pairwise stable networks. For a proof I refer to Appendix A.6 of this survey.
eorem 5.6 (Monadic equivalence theorem)
Let the network payoff function φ and the link formation cost structure c = (ci j )i, j ∈N be given such
that ci j > 0 for all i, j ∈ N with i , j . en a network д ∈ GN is monadically stable for (φ, c) if and
only if д is strictly pairwise stable for the network payoff function φa given by
φai (д) = φi (д) −
∑
i j ∈Li (д)
ci j .
rough the monadic stability concept we have considered the notion of confidence—as a form of
mutual trust—into an advanced equilibrium concept, specifically designed for network formation.
Confidence is introduced as an internalised feature into the behaviour of the players in network for-
mation. us, trusting behaviour is as such a individualised feature rather than a social normative
phenomenon.
e strength as well as the weakness of this approach is the myopic nature of the belief sys-
tems. Players do not apply very sophisticated reasoning; they only look at the first order effects
of link formation. Natural future extensions of this line of theoretical research should explore
the possibility of introducing forward looking behaviour to understand how farsightedly stable
networks arise. is can be compared with existing models of farsighted network formation de-
veloped in Deroı¨an (2003), Dua, Ghosal, and Ray (2005), Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2005) and
Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2009).
5.2 A comparison with unilateral stability
Monadic stability seems to be founded on the same principles as unilateral stability. Indeed, recall
that a network is unilaterally stable if there is no player who can induce changes to the network
based on the belief that other players will consent to these changes if they are not harmful to them.
Note here that unilateral stability assumes a fully rational form of farsightedness in the decision
making process: All proposed changes to the network—as made by a single player—are fully taken
into account by all involved players before consent is granted. us, unilateral stability assumes
a sophisticated level of rational forecasting by all players, who need to consent to the proposed
changes to the network.
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is implies that unilateral stability is indeed founded on the principle of trusting behaviour.
Implicitly, players are indeed acting on beliefs that other players will act in their self-interest when
confronted with proposed changes to their link sets. As such, unilateral stability is a trust equilib-
rium concept.
On the other hand, monadic stability assumes amuch less sophisticated form of rational decision
making. Indeed, players are actually assumed to be boundedly rational only. First, players form
monadic beliefs that only take first-order changes to the payoffs of other individualised into account.
So, if a player proposes to add multiple links, her beliefs are founded on payoff changes per addition
of a single link rather than the complete set of links. Beliefs are, thus, founded on a bounded way
of reasoning by these players.
Second, only aer beliefs are formed, all players base their actions on maximising their payoffs
given these boundedly rational monadic beliefs. ere is a build-in mismatch of beliefs and actual
outcomes in the form of realised changes to the network. However, actual actions need to confirm
the monadic beliefs of players. is pushes the decisionmaking process from unrealistic to justified,
since these beliefs are observed by the player decision makers.
As argued above, monadic stability is a trust equilibrium concept as well and is designed explic-
itly to be based on an embedded form of trusting behaviour in the disguise of belief formation on
trusting principles. ese trusting principles are not violated due to the confirmation condition in
the monadic stability concept—in contrast to the weak monadic stability notion.
erefore, for short, monadic stability is founded on a boundedly rational form of trusting be-
haviour. is contrasts with unilateral stability inwhich all decisions are based on amore farsighted
implementation of similar ideas.
A formal comparison. Next I consider a more technical comparison of the two concepts. From
the discussion above it cannot be expected that the application of monadic stability and unilateral
stability results in exactly the same class of stable network. is is the subject of the next examples.
Example 5.7 Consider Example 4.7. We reproduce the payoff information in this example with
three players. As before N = {1, 2, 3} and φ denotes the network payoff function. Link formation
is assumed to be costless, i.e., ci j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
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Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0
д1 = {12} 0 0 2 M-stable
д2 = {13} 0 0 0
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} −1 0 0
д5 = {12, 23} 0 −1 0
д6 = {13, 23} 0 1 1
д7 = дN 3 3 3 M- & U-stable
e two networks of interest areд1 and д7 = дN . Since bothд1 and д7 are strict pairwise stable, they
are also monadically stable according to the equivalence theorem.
To show explicitly that Network д1 is monadically stable, I go through the exercise of identifying
a supporting communication profile with a corresponding monadic belief system. Indeed, д1 is
supported by the non-superfluous communication profile ℓ1 = ( (1, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0) ). is results
into a monadic belief system given by
ℓ
1⋆
1 = (−, (1, 0), (0, 0) )
ℓ
2⋆
1 = ((1, 0),−, (0, 0) )
ℓ
3⋆
1 = ((1, 0), (1, 0),− )
Obviously, the communication profile ℓ1 is contained in the set of best responses to this monadic
belief system indeed are unique for all players and confirm .
Similarly, д7 is monadically stable. It was already discussed in Example 4.7 that д7 is unilaterally
stable. 
e previous example clearly shows that the class of monadically stable networks can be strictly
larger than the class of unilaterally stable networks. e next example explores this further and
shows that these two conceptions lead to completely different sets of stable networks.
Example 5.8 Again consider the by-now familiar case of three players N = {1, 2, 3}. Let the
network payoff function φ be given in the table below and assume that link formation is costless,
i.e., ci j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
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Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0
д1 = {12} 1 1 2 M-stable
д2 = {13} 0 0 0
д3 = {23} 0 0 0
д4 = {12, 13} 0 0 1
д5 = {12, 23} 0 0 1
д6 = {13, 23} 3 3 3 U-stable
д7 = дN 4 2 4
e table reports the stability properties of the various networks. ere emerge three interesting
networks to be investigated, namely д1, д6 and д7 = дN . I discuss these in detail below:
Network д1: We investigate the stability properties of this network. First, note that д1 is not uni-
laterally stable. Indeed, player 3 prefers to propose the formation of links 13 and 23 to create
network дN , which represents a strict Pareto improvement for all players in N .
Second, network д1 is supported by a non-superfluous communication profile that is repre-
sented as ℓ1 = ( (1, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0) ). is results into a monadic belief system given by
ℓ
1⋆
1 = (−, (1, 0), (0, 0) )
ℓ
2⋆
1 = ((1, 0),−, (0, 0) )
ℓ
3⋆
1 = ((1, 0), (1, 0),− )
Clearly ℓ1 constitutes a best response profile to the given monadic belief system and the
monadic belief system is confirmed through ℓ1, showing thatд1 is supported as a monadically
stable network.13
Network д6: First, note that д6 is strongly pairwise stable as well as unilaterally stable. Indeed,
only player 1 has an incentive to add link 12 to form the complete network д7 = дN , which
is rejected by player 2 due to a loss in payoff. ere are no players who have incentives to
sever any of the two existing links.
Next, д6 is not monadically stable. Indeed, take the non-superfluous communication profile
that supports it, given by ℓ6 = ( (0, 1), (0, 1), (1, 1) ). en the corresponding monadic belief
13Similarly, note that д1 is actually a strictly pairwise stable network. e equivalence theorem shows that, therefore,
д1 has to be monadically stable.
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system is
ℓ1⋆6 = (−, (0, 1), (1, 1) )
ℓ2⋆6 = ((1, 1),−, (1, 1) )
ℓ3⋆6 = ((0, 1), (0, 1),− )
Obviously, the communication profile ℓ6 is a best response to themonadic belief system above.
is implies that д6 is weakly monadically stable. However, it is not monadically stable. In-
deed, player 2 believes that player 1 would pursue the creation of a link with her—as repre-
sented by ℓ2⋆12 = 1. is is not as described by ℓ
6; player 1 does not propose a link to player 2
and, as such, the belief system of player 2 is not confirmed in the equilibrium communication
profile.
Network д7 = дN : To conclude the discussion of the situation described in this example, we con-
sider the complete networkд7 = дN , which is uniquely supported by the communication pro-
file ℓ7 = ( (1, 1), (1, 1), (1, 1) ). e resulting monadic belief systems can now be represented
by
ℓ
1⋆
7 = (−, (0, 1), (1, 1) )
ℓ
2⋆
7 = ((1, 1),−, (1, 1) )
ℓ
3⋆
7 = ((1, 1), (1, 1),− )
Obviously, the communication strategy ℓ71 = (1, 1) is not a best response to ℓ1⋆7 , since player
1 expects player 2 not to form a link with her. erefore, ℓ7 is not supported as a monadically
stable communication profile. us, д7 is not weakly monadically stable.
Furthermore, this network is neither unilaterally stable; in particular, it is not link deletion
proof. Indeed, player 2 has an incentive to break the link with player 1 to move to network
д6.
is example clearly shows that the class of unilaterally stable networks can be completely disjoint
from the class of monadically stable networks. In this example, however, the unilaterally stable
network is weakly monadically stable. is implies that in a unilaterally stable network monadic
beliefs can destabilise the network, leading to unending improvement aempts by the players in
the network. us, boundedly rational belief formation can undermine a farsightedly rational foun-
dation for the network; as such, it represents an example of a direct conflict between farsighted or
full and boundedly rational behaviour. 
ese examples clearly delineate the relationship between unilateral stability and monadic stability.
It is clear that the two concepts are different expressions of trusting behaviour in network formation.
Both are founded on the principle that players confidently try to create links with other players
when they are convinced that these players will actually benefit from that.
Both concepts result into different classes of networks, which are relatively small. Unilateral net-
works form a subclass of the strongly pairwise stable networks, while monadically stable networks
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are exactly the strictly pairwise stable networks. In both cases it is clear that trusting behaviour or
confidence in network formation supports networks that are non-empty and relatively small classes
of non-trivial networks.
5.3 Existence of monadically stable networks
e question of existence of monadically stable networks is an important one. e previous dis-
cussion already identified the class of monadically stable networks to be exactly equal to the class
of strictly pairwise stable networks. Obviously, this class might be empty for a large set of net-
work payoff structures. In this section I discuss conditions under which this class of networks is
non-empty.
I refer here mainly to the framework set out in Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). In that paper, it
is explored what the consequences are of founding network payoffs on an underlying link-based
structure—denoted as a potential. Network payoff functions that admit a potential impose a payoff
structure in which players assess the value of links in a similar fashion. It can be shown that for
network payoff structures that are founded on such potentials, there exist strictly pairwise stable
networks.
In the subsequent discussion, I summarise the main insights from Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007).
For details of the proofs of the main theorems I also refer to that paper and its appendices.
Before stating the main definitions and the resulting properties, I recall the definition of cer-
tain potentials in the context of a non-cooperative game (A,π ) on the player set N as seminally
introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Definition 5.9 Let (A,π ) be a non-cooperative game on player set N . en:
(a) e game (A,π ) admits an exact potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) if
there exists a function P : A→ R such that
πi (a) − πi (bi ,a−i ) = P(a) − P(bi ,a−i ) (22)
for every player i ∈ N , every strategy tuple a ∈ A and every strategy bi ∈ Ai .
(b) e game (A,π ) admits an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) if
there exists a function P : A→ R such that
πi (a) > πi (bi ,a−i ) if and only if P(a) > P(bi ,a−i ) (23)
for every player i ∈ N , every strategy tuple a ∈ A and every strategy bi ∈ Ai .
Based on the various notions of potentials introduced byMonderer and Shapley (1996), we can now
consider how network payoff structures might be founded on similar considerations.
Network potentials. ere are two main conceptions of the notion of a potential as a founding
device in the determination of network payoffs. Again we refer to these notions as an “exact po-
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tential” and an “ordinal potential”, following the accepted terminology in the literature. e next
definition introduces these two notions.
Definition 5.10 Let φ : GN → RN be a network payoff function.
(a) e network payoff function φ is said to admit an exact potential if there exists a function
Λ : GN → R such that
φi (д) − φi (д − ij) = Λ(д) − Λ(д − ij) (24)
for every network д ∈ GN , every player i ∈ N and every link ij ∈ Li (д).
(b) e network payoff function φ is said to admit an ordinal potential if there exists a function
Λ : GN → R such that
φi (д) = φi (д − ij) if and only if Λ(д) = Λ(д − ij) (25)
for every network д ∈ GN , every player i ∈ N and every link ij ∈ Li (д).
An exact potential imposes that the network payoff structure exhibits a uniformity of how players
assess the addition or deletion of a link to a network. is potential imposes a uniformity of these
modifications of networks in cardinal terms. It is clear that the admiance of an exact potential is
a very strong condition on the network payoff structure. is is confirmed by the following insight
from Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007, eorem 3.3):
Lemma 5.11 A network payoff function φ admits an exact potential if and only if the corresponding
Myerson model Γφ admits an exact potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996).
e admiance of an ordinal potential in a network payoff structure imposes a uniform assessment
of deleting and adding links to networks by all players in purely ordinal terms. Although this prop-
erty is significantly weaker than the admiance of an exact potential, it remain a rather demanding
condition on the network payoff structure. e next lemma makes clear that there is again a rela-
tionship with the notion of an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996). e
next lemma is stated as eorem 4.3 in Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). For a proof I refer to that
source.
Lemma 5.12 Let φ be some network payoff structure. If the corresponding Myerson model Γφ admits
an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996), then φ admits an ordinal potential.
e reverse of the assertion stated in Lemma 5.12 is not true, as shown in Chakrabarti and Gilles
(2007, Example 4.4).
Properties of network payoff structures that admit potentials. We can essentially distin-
guish three classes of network payoff structures. First, those network payoff structures that admit
an exact potential; second, those network payoff structures for which the corresponding Myerson
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game admits an ordinal potential; and, finally, those network payoff structures that admit an ordinal
potential. Each of these classes is larger than the previous.
e next proposition collects some properties of the third class, namely those network payoff
structures that admit an ordinal potential. For proofs of these assertions I again refer to Chakrabarti and Gilles
(2007).
Proposition 5.13 Let φ be some network payoff structure that admits an ordinal potential Λ. en
the following properties hold:
(i) ere exists at least one pairwise stable network.
(ii) e sets of strongly pairwise stable and strictly pairwise stable networks coincide.
eclass of network payoff structures forwhich the correspondingMyerson game admits an ordinal
potential is particularly interesting. Indeed, Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007, eorem 5.7) show that
for this class of network payoff structures there exist strictly pairwise stable networks. I state for
completeness the complete assertion:
Proposition 5.14 Let φ be a network payoff function for which the corresponding Myerson model Γφ
admits an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996). en there exists at least one
strictly pairwise stable network for φ.
is property gives rise to the main conclusion regarding the existence of a monadically stable net-
work. Indeed, the admiance of an ordinal potential in theMyersonmodel gives rise to the existence
of a strictly pairwise stable network, which in turn is monadically stable due to the fundamental
equivalence theorem. erefore, we can conclude the following main insight:
eorem 5.15 Let φ : GN → RN be a network payoff structure and let c : N × N → R+ be a link
formation cost structure. If the corresponding consent model with two-sided link formation costs Γaφ (c)
admits an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996), then there exists at least one
monadically stable network for (φ, c).
6 Correlated network formation
e previous discussion focussed mainly on the internalisation of trust in the behaviour of players
to result into so-called “trusting behaviour” in link formation. We chose to internalise trusting be-
haviour in the form of belief systems (monadic stability) or through stability concepts themselves
(unilateral stability). However, there is rather different an approach possible in which trusting be-
haviour is explicitly modelled through an externally determined institutional arrangement. ese
institutional arrangements are implemented collectively and are endowed with a form of collec-
tively accepted self-enforcement.
Here I mainly will consider behavioural rules that can be viewed as being part of a trusted gov-
ernance system. All players are assumed to be embedded in such a governance system through the
embeddedness hypothesis. In the discussion we use game theoretic concepts to give this embedded-
ness an explicit, institutional form as a generally accepted behavioural rule.
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I use concepts from game theory that are well-accepted. Until now it seems that these theo-
retical configurations have not been interpreted from a perspective founded on social embedded-
ness. Rather they were viewed as purely methodologically individualistic. is seems to be a mis-
interpretation.
Correlation devices. e seminal study by Aumann (1974) introduced an innovative way to
look at coordination among decision makers. How can decision makers achieve a higher payoff
than that is allowed through the set of supported Nash equilibria? Aumann’s answer is to look at
arrangements external to these decision makers that allow them to coordinate on a higher payoff.
ese arrangements are denoted as correlation devices.
e basic idea is that the decisions made by players are influenced by things that are external
to the decision problem itself, but are situated in its immediate surrounding. e classical example
is that of a traffic light.14
e game theoretic representation is a form of the Game of Chicken as explored extensively in
the literature. Two drivers approach a road crossing. At the crossing, each driver can either “stop”
(action S) or “continue” (actionC). If both continue there will result a crash; if both stop, both look
foolish and need to coordinate their passing through prolonged negotiation (with hand gestures);
and if one stops and the other continues, there is regret of the stopper and maximal payoff to the
one who continues. e resulting payoffs can be captured by the following game-theoretic payoff
matrix:
S C
S 5,5 2,7
C 7,2 0,0
ere result three Nash equilibria in mixed strategies here, namely one driver stops and the other
continues—resulting in payoffs (7, 2) and (2, 7) depending on who actually stops—and the case in
which both players stop or continue with equal probability—resulting into the expected payoff
vector
(
3 12 , 3
1
2
)
. e laer includes a probability of 14 of a crash, due to both players continuing.
Now consider that there is an outside regulator added to this situation in the form of a traffic
light. e most important assumption of this arrangement is that both drivers are fully informed
about what fraction of time the traffic light is in what colour. Hence, both drivers know the prob-
ability distribution that is implemented through the traffic light. We investigate two traffic light
arrangements:
• First, consider that with equal probability the traffic light gives a red light to one player and
a green light to the other. Adopting the normal rule to stop for red and to continue for green,
we actually coordinate between the two Nash equilibria (S,C) and (C,S), resulting into an
14e following discussion is mainly based on the excellent account of correlated equilibrium in Chapter 9 of
Maschler, Solan, and Zamir (2013). I recommend the interested reader to look at their presentation.
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expected payoff computed as
E π1 =
1
2 (7, 2) + 12 (2, 7) =
(
4 12 , 4
1
2
)
.
Here there no positive probability of a crash and both drivers are reasonably content with
their expected payoff.
Would this traffic light be self-enforceable within the given social decision situation? We need
to check whether this traffic light arrangement is indeed beneficial to both player drivers
if it is implemented as suggested by these two drivers. Obviously, if any of these drivers
deviates from the recommendation, while the other follows it, there is a crash—resulting in
zero payoffs. So, the suggested arrangement is indeed self-enforcing.
• In comparison with our regular traffic light, we can even increase the expected payoff by
introducing a more complicated coordination device. Indeed, consider a traffic light that can
stop both drivers simultaneously with a given probability. In that case, the drivers negotiate
themselves and proceed with caution. So, the traffic light can give both drivers simultane-
ously the signal “red”, at which both drivers are suggested to stop and proceed with caution.
is allows the mixing of three outcomes in this decision situation. Suppose now that the traf-
fic light gives both drivers simultaneously “red” with probability 12 and one driver “red” and
the other driver “green” with equal probabilities 14 .
15 We can depict the resulting probability
distribution over all outcomes in a probability matrix:
S C
S 12
1
4
C 14 0
e resulting expected payoffs can now be computed as
E π2 =
1
2 (5, 5) + 14 (7, 2) + 14 (2, 7) =
(
4 34 , 4
3
4
) ≫ ( 4 12 , 4 12 ) = E π1.
Again we can ask whether this traffic light is self-enforcing. If one driver receives “red”, he
knows that the other driver receives “red” with probability 23 and “green” with probability
1
3 .
So, if he continues there is a crash with probability 13 and he receives an expected payoff of
1
3 ·0+ 23 ·7 = 4 23 < 4 34 , the laer being the expected payoff if he follows the recommendation of
the traffic light. Again, we conclude that the traffic light arrangement is indeed self-enforcing;
no player has an incentive to deviate from the provided arrangement and recommendations.
One can ask whether this reasoning can be extended to even higher payoffs. Indeed, Aumann
showed that this is the case up to payoff level 5. e arrangement that both drivers always face a
red light—that is, “red” with probability 1—is, of course, not self-enforcing.
15is means that both drivers get private recommendations from the traffic light; they do not know what the colour
to the other driver is. is is the usual arrangement in our traffic law.
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Correlation devices in network formation. Correlation devices can also be introduced in the
processes of network formation. I return to the network formation process under consent that
we discussed thus far and consider how external correlation devices in the form of external rec-
ommender systems can guide players to form “good” networks. We first take a look at a by-now
familiar network formation situation with three players.
Example 6.1 As before, let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of three players. Also, we choose φ to be a
minor modification of the network payoff function studied in Example 5.8, given in the table below,
and again we assume that link formation is costless, i.e., ci j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
As reported in the table below, there are actually five M-networks, namely all strong link deletion
proof networks given by M = {д0,д1,д2,д3,д6}. ese five M-networks correspond only to three
payoff vectors, namely (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 2) and (3, 3, 3).16
Network д φ1(д) φ2(д) φ3(д) Stability
д0 =  0 0 0 M
д1 = {12} 1 1 2 Monadic
д2 = {13} 0 0 0 M
д3 = {23} 0 0 0 M
д4 = {12, 13} 0 12 1
д5 = {12, 23} 0 0 1
д6 = {13, 23} 3 3 3 Unilateral
д7 = дN 4 2 4
e main question I consider here is: Can we introduce a correlation device in this network forma-
tion situation that results in higher expected payoffs than those from the high-paying unilaterally
stable network д6? Indeed, д6 is the most obvious M-network that the players can aim for.
17 ere-
fore, the payoff vector (3, 3, 3) acts as a benchmark in relationship to any correlation device.
Consider an external recommender system that simultaneously recommends (i) all three players
to execute communication strategy (1, 1) with probability 0.8 and (ii) the arrangement of (1, 1) for
player 1 and (1, 0) for both players 2 and 3 with probability 0.2. us, the system recommends the
three players to formд4 with probability 0.2 andд7 with probability 0.8. e expected payoffs under
this system are now given by
E π = 0.2 · φ(д4) + 0.8 · φ(д7) = 0.2 × (0, 12, 1) + 0.8 × (4, 2, 4) = (3.2, 4, 3.4).
16ese five M-networks include the unique monadically stable network д1 and the unique unilaterally stable network
д6. Clearly, this example therefore delineates the possible models that we have considered thus far.
17Unilateral stability of this network implies that selfish, trusting behaviour can indeed guide these players to form
this network.
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Hence, E π = (3.2, 4, 3.4) ≫ (3, 3, 3) = φ(д6). erefore, coordinating the link building actions
through this recommender system results into a strict Pareto improvement over the unilaterally
stable network.
Note that none of the three players has any incentive to deviate from the recommended actions.
Indeed, all players gain strictly in comparison with regard to д6.
e most remarkable of this recommender system is that it uses non-M-networks only. erefore,
this correlation device is founded on considerations outside the realm of the stability concepts that
we have considered thus far. It shows that inefficient networks and non-stable networks play a role
in network formation processes. 
e example above shows just a single application of the correlated equilibrium concept to network
formation analysis. e application of this concept opens the way to further exploration, even
though the multitude of correlated equilibria is discouraging. Indeed, Aumann showed that the
collection of expected payoff vectors supported by correlated equilibria includes the convex hull of
all Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. is is rather daunting and discouraging from the perspective
that correlation will not lead to a smaller class of supported networks.
However, the main research question that is still open is whether there exists a specific class of
correlation devices that could guide players to highly productive networks. roughout our history,
humans have in fact found ways to implement very effective correlation devices to build effective
and high-paying networks. is includes recommender systems such as job recommendation refer-
rals and recommendations through friendship networks. Further exploration of these systems from
a Aummannian perspective is required to develop a theory that interprets these practical systems
as correlation devices.
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A Proofs of the main theorems
A.1 Proof of eorem 3.2.
If: Let φ be convex on D(φ). Obviously from the definitions and the discussions it follows that
Ds (φ) ⊂ D(φ). us, we only have to show that D(φ) ⊂ Ds (φ).
Now letд ∈ D(φ). en for every player i ∈ N and link ij ∈ Li (д) it has to hold thatφi (д) > φi (д−ij)
due to link deletion proofness of д. In particular, for any link set h ⊂ Li (д) :
∑
i j ∈h[φi (д) − φi (д −
ij) ] > 0. Since φ is convex on D(φ) and д ∈ D(φ), it follows that φi (д) > φi (д − h) for every link
set h ⊂ Li (д). In other words, д is strong link deletion proof, i.e., д ∈ Ds (φ).
Only if: Assume thatD(φ) = Ds (φ). Suppose further to the contrary that the payoff structure φ is
not convex onD(φ). en there exists some networkд ∈ D(φ) and some player i ∈ N such that for
some link set h ⊂ Li (д) we have that
∑
i j ∈h[φi (д) − φi (д − ij) ] > 0 as well as φi (д) < φi (д − h). But
then this implies straightforwardly that player i would prefer to sever all links in h, i.e., д < Ds (φ).
us, д cannot be strong link deletion proof giving us the necessary contradiction.
is completes the proof of the assertion of eorem 3.2.
A.2 Proof of eorem 3.5.
Assertion (a) is trivial and a proof is therefore omied.
Proof of (b).
If: Let φ be discerning on A(φ). Suppose that д is LAP. Furthermore, assume that i, j ∈ N with
ij < д are such that φi (д + ij) > φi (д). Now, if φ j (д + ij) = φ j (д), then by definition of φ being
discerning, φi (д+ ij) > φi (д). is contradicts the hypothesis that д is LAP. us, φ j (д+ ij) < φ j (д),
confirming that д is indeed⋆-LAP.
Only if: Suppose that φ is not discerning on A(φ). en there exists some network д that is LAP
and for some i, j ∈ N with ij < д it holds that φi (д + ij) = φi (д) as well as φ j (д + ij) = φ j (д). But
this immediately implies that д can in fact not be⋆-LAP, since the link ij should be in д for it to be
⋆-LAP. is is a contradiction.
Proof of (c).
If: Suppose that φ is uniform onA⋆(φ) and take some д ∈ A⋆(φ). Assume that i, j ∈ N with ij < д.
en first suppose that
φi (д) 6 φi (д + ij). (26)
en by д being ⋆-LAP it has to hold that
φ j (д) > φ j (д + ij). (27)
But also by uniformity of φ it has to hold that
φ j (д) 6 φ j (д + ij). (28)
But (27) is in direct contradiction to (28). us, we conclude that (26) cannot hold. erefore, for
any ij < д it has to hold that φi (д) > φi (д+ ij) as well as φ j (д) > φ j (д + ij). Hence, we conclude that
д is actually SLAP, i.e., д ∈ As (φ).
Only if: Assume thatAs (φ) = A⋆(φ). Now take д ∈ A⋆(φ) to be⋆-LAP. en from д being SLAP,
it follows that φi (д) > φi (д + ij) as well as φ j (д) > φ j (д + ij). is implies that φ indeed has to be
uniform for д.
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is proves the assertion of eorem 3.5.
A.3 Proof of eorem 4.13.
(a) implies (c): Let ℓ⋆ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium in (Aa ,πa). en denote д⋆ = дm (ℓ⋆) =
{ij ∈ дN | ℓ⋆i j = ℓ⋆ji = 1}. We show that д⋆ is strong link deletion proof for the derived network
payoff function φa .
Suppose player i deletes a certain link set hi ⊂ Li (д⋆). Define ℓi ∈ Aai as ℓi j = 1 if ij ∈ д⋆ − hi
and ℓi j = 0 for ij < д
⋆ − hi . en by ℓ⋆ being a Nash equilibrium in (Aa ,πa) it follows that
дm (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i ) = д⋆ − hi and πai (ℓ⋆) > πai (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i ). Hence,
φai (д⋆) = φi (д⋆) −
∑
j ∈Ni (д⋆)
ci j = π
a
i (ℓ⋆) +
∑
k : ℓ⋆
ik
=1, ℓ⋆
ki
=0
cik
> πai (ℓ⋆) > πai (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i ) = φi (дm(ℓi , ℓ⋆−i )) −
∑
k,i
ℓik · cik
= φi (д⋆ − hi ) −
∑
k∈Ni (д⋆−hi )
cik = φ
a
i (д⋆ − hi ).
is proves that д⋆ is strong link deletion proof for φa .
(c) implies (b): Suppose that д⋆ ⊂ дN is a strong link deletion proof network for φa . We show that
it is supported by a non-superfluous Nash equilibrium strategy in (Aa ,πa). Consider the unique
non-superfluous strategy profile ℓ⋆ ∈ Aa such that дm (ℓ⋆) = д⋆. We proceed to show that ℓ⋆ is a
Nash equilibrium in (Aa ,πa) and ℓ⋆i j = 1 if and only if ij ∈ д⋆. Indeed,
πai (ℓ⋆) = φi (дm(ℓ⋆)) −
∑
k,i
ℓ
⋆
ik · cik = φi (д⋆) −
∑
k∈Ni (д⋆)
cik = φ
a
i (д⋆).
Next, for some player i consider some deviation ℓi , ℓ
⋆
i . Define hi = {ik ∈ д⋆ | ℓik = 0}. en,
дm (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i ) = д⋆ − hi . Since д⋆ is strong link deletion proof with respect to φa , it follows that
φai (д⋆ − hi ) 6 φai (д⋆). us,
πai (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i ) = φi (дm (ℓi , ℓ⋆−i )) −
∑
k,i
ℓik · cik
= φi (д⋆ − hi ) −
∑
k∈Ni (д⋆−hi )
cik −
∑
k : ℓik=1, ℓ
⋆
ki
=0
cik
6 φi (д⋆ − hi ) −
∑
k∈Ni (д⋆−hi )
cik
= φai (д⋆ − hi ) 6 φai (д⋆) = πai (l⋆).
is proves that the non-superfluous signal profile ℓ⋆ is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Trivially (b) implies (a), which proves the assertion and completes the proof of eorem 4.13.
A.4 Proof of eorem 4.16
Letд⋆ be strong link deletion proof under the net payoff functionφb . Forд⋆, define a non-superfluous
communication profile λ⋆ = (l⋆, r⋆) ∈ Ab as follows:
(i) l⋆i j = r
⋆
ji = 1 if ij ∈ д⋆ and γi j < γji , or
(ii) l⋆i j = r
⋆
ji = 1 if ij ∈ д⋆, γi j = γji and i < j , or
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(iii) l⋆i j = r
⋆
ji = 0 if ij < д
⋆.
Obviously, дb
(
l⋆, r⋆
)
= д⋆ and
πbi (λ⋆) = φi
(
дb (λ⋆)
)
−
∑
j,i
l⋆i j · γi j = φi (д⋆) −
∑
j ∈Ωi (д⋆)
γi j = φ
b
i (д⋆).
Now, for player i ∈ N consider an arbitrary deviation λ̂i =
(
l̂i , r̂i
)
,
(
l⋆i , r
⋆
i
)
= λ⋆i . In any such
deviation, no new links will be formed because if ij < д⋆, it follows that l⋆ji = r
⋆
ji = 0. However,
links in i’s neighbourhood link set Li (д⋆) can be deleted. Hence, let дb
(
λ̂i , λ
⋆
−i
)
= д⋆ − hi where
hi ⊂ Li (д⋆).
We prove that j ∈ Ni (д⋆ −hi ) and
[
γi j < γji or γi j = γji , i < j
]
implies that l̂i j = 1. In other words,
j ∈ Ωi (д⋆ − hi ) ⊂ Ni (д⋆ − hi ) implies that l̂i j = 1.
Now, assume by contradiction that for some j ∈ Ωi (д⋆ − hi ) : l̂i j = 0. Now,
j ∈ Ni (д⋆ − hi ) ⇔ l̂i j = 1 and r⋆ji = 1 or r̂i j = 1 and l⋆ji = 1. (29)
But l⋆ji = 1 implies by construction that γi j > γji or γi j = γji , i > j . Furthermore, r
⋆
ji = 1 implies by
construction that γi j < γji or γi j = γji , i < j . Since l̂i j = 0, by (29), it follows that r̂i j = l
⋆
ji = 1 which
implies that γi j > γji or γi j = γji with i > j . is contradicts j ∈ Ωi (д⋆ − hi ) completing the proof
of the claim stated above.
Now, the proven claim implies that∑
j ∈Ωi (д⋆−hi )
γi j 6
∑
j ∈Ni (д⋆−hi )̂
li j · γi j 6
∑
j,i
l̂i j · γi j . (30)
Hence,
πbi
(
λ̂i , λ
⋆
−i
)
= φi
(
дb (λ̂i , λ⋆−i )
)
−
∑
j,i
l̂i j · γi j = φi
(
д⋆ − hi
) −∑
j,i
l̂i j · γi j
6 φi
(
д⋆ − hi
) − ∑
j ∈Ωi (д⋆−hi )
γi j = φ
b
i (д⋆ − hi )
6 φbi (д⋆) = πbi
(
l⋆, r⋆
)
.
e first inequality follows from (30) and the second follows from the fact that д⋆ is strong link
deletion proof with respect to φb . is completes the proof of eorem 4.16.
A.5 Proof of eorem 4.21
Letд⋆ be supported by a Nash equilibrium signalling profile ℓ⋆ ∈ Aa in the consent model with two-
sided link formation costs (Aa ,πa). We now construct a non-superfluous strategy tuple
(
l̂, r̂
)
∈ Ab
in the consent model with one-sided link formation costs such that дb
(
l̂ , r̂
)
= д⋆ and
(
l̂ , r̂
)
is a
Nash equilibrium in (Ab ,πb ).
From eorem 4.13, we can assume without loss of generality that ℓ⋆ ∈ Aa is non-superfluous.
Given ℓ⋆, we define λ̂ =
(
l̂ , r̂
)
∈ Ab by
(i) l̂i j = r̂ji = 1 and l̂ji = r̂i j = 0 if and only if ℓ
⋆
i j = ℓ
⋆
ji = 1, and either ci j < cji , or ci j = cji
with i < j .
(ii) l̂i j = l̂ji = r̂i j = r̂ji = 0 if and only if ℓ
⋆
i j = ℓ
⋆
ji = 0.
53
It follows immediately that λ̂ =
(
l̂, r̂
)
is a non-superfluous communication profile inAb supporting
дb
(
l̂, r̂
)
= д⋆.
It remains to be shown that λ̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the consent model with one sided link
formation costs. We sketch the proof of this assertion.
Now, if λ̂ is not a Nash equilibrium, then it has to be because some player prefers to delete one or
more of her links. Also, any link delivers the same benefit to the player as under two-sided link
formation costs, while it would cost no more to establish the link. us, preferring to keep a link
under two-sided link formation costs, implies that the player would prefer to keep the link under
one-sided link formation costs. Mathematical details of this argument are le to the reader.
is completes the proof of eorem 4.21.
A.6 Proof of eorem 5.6
We first develop some simple auxiliary insights for weakly monadically stable networks. Suppose
that д ∈ GN is weakly monadically stable relative to the data φ and c = (ci j )i, j ∈N . en there exists
some action tuple ℓˆ ∈ Aa such that д = д(ℓˆ) and for every player i ∈ N : ℓˆi ∈ Aai is a best response
to the monadic belief system ℓˆi⋆−i ∈ Aa−i for the payoff function πa .
For this seing we state two auxiliary results.
Lemma A.1 If ℓˆi⋆ji = 0 and ci j > 0, then ℓi j = 0 is the unique best response to ℓˆ
i⋆
−i .
Proof. Clearly, if player i selects ℓi j = 1, i only incurs strictly positive costs ci j > 0 and no benefits.
is implies that player i makes a loss from trying to establish link ij . Hence, ℓi j = 0 is the unique
best response to ℓˆi⋆−i .
Lemma A.2 If ij ∈ д(ℓˆ) with ci j > 0 as well as cji > 0, then ℓˆi⋆ji = ℓˆj⋆i j = 1.
Proof. We remark that ij ∈ д = д(ℓˆ) if and only if ℓˆi j = ℓˆji = 1. e negation of the assertion stated
in Lemma A.1 applied to ℓˆi j = 1 and ℓˆji = 1 independently now implies that ℓˆ
i⋆
ji = ℓˆ
j⋆
i j = 1.
We also require a partial characterisation of weakly monadically stable networks. is is stated in
the following lemma.
Lemma A.3 Let the cost structure c ≫ 0 be strictly positive. en every weakly monadically stable
network д ∈ GN in the consent model with two-sided link formation costs (Aa ,πa) is link deletion
proof for the network payoff function φa .
Proof. Suppose thatд ∈ GN is weaklymonadic in the consent model with two-sided link formation
costs (Aa ,πa). en there exists some communication profile ℓˆ ∈ Aa such that д = д(ℓˆ) and for
every player i ∈ N : ℓˆi ∈ Aai is a best response to ℓˆi⋆−i for the game theoretic payoff function πa .
Suppose now that д is not link deletion proof for φa . en there exists some i ∈ N with ij ∈ д for
some j , i and φa(д − ij) > φai (д), implying that φi (д − ij) + ci j > φi (д). By definition, ℓˆj⋆i j = 0.
Hence, from Lemma A.1, ℓji = 0 is the unique best response to ℓˆ
j⋆ for player j . Since ij ∈ д by
assumption it has to hold that ℓˆji = 1. is contradicts the hypothesis that ℓˆj is a best response to
ℓˆ
j⋆
−j .
is contradiction indeed shows that д has to be link deletion proof relative to φa .
e proof of eorem 5.6 now proceeds as follows.
First we show that strict pairwise stability for φa implies monadic stability in (Aa ,πa) under the
hypothesis that c ≫ 0.
Let д ∈ GN be a network that is strictly pairwise stable with regard to the network payoff function
φa as given in the assertion. en д is strong link deletion proof and satisfies the property that
ij < д implies that φai (д + ij) < φai (д) as well as φaj (д + ij) < φaj (д).
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Hence, this can be rewrien as
ij < д implies φi (д + ij) − ci j < φi (д) as well as φ j (д + ij) − cji < φ j (д). (31)
With д we define for all i ∈ N :
ℓˆi j = 1 if ij ∈ д
ℓˆi j = 0 if ij < д
Hence, д(ℓˆ) = д and ℓˆ is non-superfluous. We now investigate whether the given communication
profile ℓˆ is indeed a best response to the monadic belief system ℓˆi⋆ for all i ∈ N as required by the
definition of weak monadic stability.
Case A: ij < д.
From (31) it follows immediately that ℓˆi⋆ji = ℓˆ
j⋆
i j = 0. From the hypothesis that ci j > 0 and
cji > 0 and the definition of monadic belief systems, it follows with Lemma A.1 that ℓˆi j = 0
is the unique best response to ℓˆi⋆−i and that that ℓˆji = 0 is the unique best response to ℓˆ
j⋆
−j .
Hence, for Case A the communication strategy ℓˆ satisfies the condition of weak monadic
stability.
Case B: ij ∈ д.
In this case ℓˆi j = ℓˆji = 1. Link deletion proofness of д now implies that ℓˆ
i⋆
ji = 1 or else (31) is
contradicted.
Cases A and B now imply that
ij ∈ д if and only if ℓˆi⋆ji = ℓˆj⋆i j = 1. (32)
Applying strong link deletion proofness and the insight for Case A leads us to the conclusion that
ℓˆi is indeed the unique best response to ℓˆ
i⋆
−i . is in turn implies that ℓˆ supports д as a weakly
monadically stable network.
Finally, it is immediately clear from (32) and the definition of ℓˆ that for all i, j ∈ N : ℓˆi⋆ji = ℓˆi j ,
implying that the monadic beliefs are indeed confirmed.
us, we conclude that ℓˆ supports д as a monadically stable network. is completes the proof of
the first part of the assertion.
Second, we show that the monadic stability of a network for (Aa ,πa) implies strict pairwise stability
for φa under the hypothesis that c ≫ 0.
Letд ∈ GN be monadically stable. en there exists some action tuple ℓˆ ∈ Aa such thatд = д(ℓˆ) and
for every player i ∈ N : ℓˆi ∈ Aai is a best response to ℓˆi⋆−i for the payoff function πa . Furthermore,
ℓˆi⋆−i = ℓˆ−i .
From Lemma A.3 we already know that д has to be link deletion proof for φa since д is weakly
monadically stable. Hence, for every ij ∈ д we have that φi (д − ij) + ci j 6 φi (д). Now through the
definition of the monadic belief systems and the self-confirming condition of monadic stability we
conclude that for every ij ∈ д:
ℓˆi j = ℓˆ
j⋆
i j = ℓˆji = ℓˆ
i⋆
ji = 1. (33)
Let i ∈ N and h ⊂ Li (д). Now we define ℓh ∈ Aai by
ℓhi j =

ℓˆi j if ij < h
0 if ij ∈ h.
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en д
(
ℓh, ℓˆ−i
)
= д − h. Since ℓˆi is a best response to ℓˆi⋆−i = ℓˆ−i it has to hold that18
πai
(
ℓh, ℓˆ−i
)
6 πai (ℓˆ).
Hence,
φi (д − h) +
∑
i j ∈h
ci j 6 φi (д). (34)
is in turn implies that φai (д − h) 6 φai (д).
Since, i ∈ N and h are chosen arbitrarily, the network д has to be strong link deletion proof.
Next, let ij < д. en ℓˆi j = 0 and/or ℓˆji = 0. Suppose that ℓˆji = 0. en by the confirmation
condition of monadic stability it follows that ℓˆi⋆ji = ℓˆji = 0. Hence by Lemma A.1, ℓˆi j = 0. us we
conclude that for every ij < д:
ℓˆi j = ℓˆ
j⋆
i j = ℓˆji = ℓˆ
i⋆
ji = 0. (35)
is in turn implies through the definition of the monadic belief system that φi (д + ij) − ci j < φi (д)
as well as φ j (д + ij) − cji < φ j (д). Or φai (д + ij) < φai (д) as well as φaj (д + ij) < φaj (д). is shows
the assertion that д is indeed strictly pairwise stable.
is completes the proof of eorem 5.6.
18Here we again apply the confirmation condition for monadic stability that is satisfied by ℓˆ.
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